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IT'S THE END OF THE WORLD AS
MUSICIANS KNOW IT, OR IS IT?
ARTISTS BATTLE THE RECORD INDUSTRY AND
CONGRESS TO RESTORE THEIR TERMINATION
RIGHTS IN SOUND RECORDINGS
INTRODUCTION
"If a song means a lot to you, imagine what it means to us."
Artists Against Piracy1
Imagine a musical artist just starting out in the business. They
spend hours practicing, trying to create a sound that will make them
stars. Night after night, they perform in bars, clubs, and cafds with the
hope that they will be noticed. Then one night it happens, a record
company representative offers the artist a chance to record an album.
As an artist, that first recording contract could be the most important
agreement she makes in her career.2 The artist, desperate for the re-
cording agreement, will typically sign a deal for a lower royalty rate,
sometimes even as low as seven percent. 3 Then the artist's dream
comes true, she has a number one song, but due to the low royalty
rate, she does not profit from it.4 Section 203 of the 1976 Copyright
Act 5 was created to remedy this situation. The creators of the Copy-
1. Artists Against Piracy, at www.artistsagainstpiracy.com/news/index.htm (last visited Feb.
28, 2001). Artists Against Piracy was a group aimed at expressing recording artists' views on
online music distribution. They used this quote in an ad campaign that was aimed at educating
the public on the impact free online music sites, such as Napster, have on recording artists.
Sherman Fridman, Music Artists Advertise for Online Rights, NEWSBYTES, July 11, 2000, available
at 2000 WL 21179794.
2. MARK HALLORAN, THE MUSICIAN'S BUSINESS & LEGAL GUIDE 326 (2d ed. 1996).
3. M. WILLIAM KRASILOVSKY & SIDNEY SHEMEL, THIS BUSINESS OF MUSIC 19 (8th ed. 2000).
Royalty rates for new artists can start from between seven to twelve percent of the retail price of
the album; however, the record companies generally reduce that amount significantly to cover
other costs. Id. For a more complete discussion of artists' royalty rates, see infra note 233 and
accompanying text.
4. In 1996, the members of the group TLC declared bankruptcy a year after their second
album, "Crazysexycool," sold ten million copies worldwide. Chuck Philips, Group Tops Charts
But Claims Bankruptcy, L.A. TIMES, May 28, 1996, at Al. The group signed a recording contract
in 1991 that paid them royalties equaling approximately seven percent on the retail price of each
album. Id. at 19. After the record company took its contractual reductions, the group was left
with sixty cents per album to divide three ways. Id.
5. 17 U.S.C. § 203(a) (1994). Section 203 provides for the termination of any exclusive or
nonexclusive grant of a transfer or license of a copyright that was executed on or after January 1,
1978. Id. This termination may take place any time during a period of five years beginning at
the end of thirty-five years from the date of execution. 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(3) (1994).
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right Act wanted to provide an author with a fair opportunity to ap-
preciate the real value of her work.6 For particular artists, the future
right to terminate a record contract and regain the rights to their re-
cordings may finally allow them the chance to profit from their
creations.
Last fall, sound recording artists had this right taken away from
them. In November 1999, Congress passed an amendment to the
Copyright Act that added sound recordings to the list of commis-
sioned or specially ordered works eligible for "work made for hire"
status.7 At first glance, this amendment would seem trivial because
most record companies claim that they own their artists' sound re-
cordings.8 However, if the recordings were in fact works made for
hire, then the artists would not be able to exercise the termination
rights under section 203.9
Prior to the 1999 amendment, it was questionable whether sound
recordings could qualify as works made for hire. The recording indus-
try claimed that sound recordings were works made for hire; but re-
cording artists continually argued that when making a contract, they
were merely licensing their works to record companies. 10 Just before
Congress passed the amendment, two federal district courts decided
that sound recordings were not eligible for work made for hire status
absent an employer-employee relationship.'
Because there were no public hearings on the matter, artists were
not given an opportunity to express their views to Congress about the
1999 amendment.' 2 However, after numerous articles in Billboard
6. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 124 (1976).
7. The Intellectual Property and Communications Omnibus Reform Act of 1999, Pub. L. No.
106-113 Appendix I, § 1011(d), 113 Stat. 1501, (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994 & Supp. V
1999)), repealed by Work Made for Hire and Copyright Corrections Act of 2000, Pub. L. No.
106-379 (2000).
8. HALLORAN, supra note 2, at 335. Most recording contracts include a provision making the
sound recordings works made for hire. Id.
9. Section 203 of the Act allows artists to regain the rights to the copyright in their works by
terminating any transfers or assignments of those rights. 17 U.S.C. § 203(a) (1994). This termi-
nation may only be done for a period of five years beginning thirty-five years after the license
has been granted. Id. Under section 203 of the Act, works made for hire are not eligible for the
termination rights. Id. For a discussion on termination rights, see infra notes 95-132 and accom-
panying text.
10. W. John Moore, Bye-Bye, American Pie, NAT'L J., May 6, 2000, at 1464.
11. See Ballas v. Tedesco, 41 F. Supp. 2d 531, 541 (D.N.J. 1999); Staggers v. Real Authentic
Sound, 77 F. Supp. 2d 57, 64 (D.D.C. 1999) (claiming in dicta that sound recordings are not
works-for-hire under the statute because they do not fit within any of the categories of specially
ordered or commissioned works).
12. Bill Holland, New Work-For-Hire Law To Be Examined: Subcommittee To Hear Wit-
nesses, BILLBOARD, May 20, 2000, at 113. The amendment was passed as a "technical change,"
meaning Congress did not have to hold hearings on the issue. Id.
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Magazine discussed the impact of the amendment, artists began to
join together to fight for their termination rights. 13 Eventually Con-
gress listened to the artists and repealed the amendment. 14 Now that
the 1999 amendment has been successfully repealed, artists and the
recording industry are back in the same positions they were in two
years ago. 15 Furthermore, there is still no final answer to the question
of whether sound recordings qualify as works made for hire.
This Comment will examine both the 1999 amendment to the Copy-
right Act and the Works Made for Hire and Copyright Corrections
Act of 2000, as well as their effects on the future of the music industry.
Part II will outline the history of the work-for-hire and termination
rights provisions of the 1976 Copyright Act and discuss various courts'
interpretations of these two provisions. 16 Part III will examine the
legislative histories of both the 1999 amendment to the works-for-hire
provision of the Copyright Act and the Works Made for Hire and
Copyright Corrections Act of 2000.17 This section will explore the
1999 amendment and the various battles between the recording indus-
try, recording artists, and Congress that led to the creation of the
Works Made for Hire and Copyright Corrections Act of 2000, which
effectively repealed the 1999 amendment. 18 Part IV will analyze the
1999 amendment to demonstrate that the amendment was in fact a
substantive change in Copyright law. This section will examine the
status of sound recordings as works made for hire before the amend-
ment. 19 This section will also compare the 1999 amendment to other
technical amendments recently passed by Congress.20 Part V will ana-
lyze the neutrality of the language of the Works Made for Hire and
Copyright Corrections Act of 2000 and examine whether it will stop
the courts from considering either amendment when determining
whether sound recordings are eligible for work-for-hire status.21 Ad-
13. Bill Holland, Artists Claim Progress With Hearing, BILLBOARD, June 10, 2000, at 96. Mu-
sical artists Sheryl Crow and Don Henley formed the Artists' Recording Coalition, a group of
musical artists and managers dedicated to protecting the rights of musical artists. Id.
14. On September 19, 2000, the House of Representatives passed the Work Made for Hire
and Copyright Corrections Act of 2000 that effectively repealed the 1999 amendment. 146
CONG. REc. H7771 (Sept. 19, 2000). On October 12, 2000, the Senate also passed the Work
Made for Hire and Copyright Corrections Act of 2000. 146 CONG. REC. S. 10498 (Oct. 12, 2000).
On October 27, 2000, the bill was officially signed into law. Work Made for Hire and Copyright
Corrections Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-379 (2000).
15. 146 CONG. REC. H7771, 7772 (Sept. 19, 2000).
16. See infra notes 24-132 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 133-192 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 135-189 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 193-334 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 334-354 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 355-377 and accompanying text.
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ditionally, this section will discuss the need for a definitive answer to
the question of whether sound recordings are eligible to be works
made for hire before 2003 and examine one of the proposed solutions
to the problem.22 Finally, Part VI will conclude that it is important to
the future of the music industry for Congress to create a definitive
answer to the question of whether sound recordings can qualify as
works made for hire under the Copyright Act.23
II. BACKGROUND: THE HISTORY OF WORKS-FOR-HIRE AND
TERMINATION RIGHTS IN THE 1976 COPYRIGHT ACT
In order to gain a clear understanding of the potential impact that
the 1999 sound recording amendment could have had on artists, the
work-for-hire provision of the 1976 Copyright Act (Act) and the ter-
mination rights provision in the Act must be fully examined. A his-
tory of the works made for hire provision of the Act, specifically the
United States Supreme Court's definition of an employee under the
Act, should first be considered. Second, an understanding of when a
work created by an independent contractor may be considered a work
made for hire is necessary. Finally, the rights provided to copyright
owners by the termination rights provision in section 203 of the Act
and the effect of a work being labeled a work made for hire on those
rights must be discussed.
A. Works Made for Hire
The Copyright Clause in the United States Constitution grants Con-
gress the power "to promote the progress of science and useful arts,
by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive
right to their respective writings and discoveries. '2 4 Through the Cop-
yright Clause, Congress created the Act,25 which gives authors an in-
centive to create by providing them special protection for their
works.26 Works-for-hire are given special protection under the Copy-
right Act.27 The Act, in a work-for-hire situation, defines the hiring
party or person for whom the work was created to be the author and,
22. See infra notes 377-396 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 391-395 and accompanying text.
24. U.S. CONs'r. Art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
25. 17 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. (1994).
26. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1994). For example, the author of a copyrighted work has exclusive
rights to that work for his lifetime plus an additional seventy years. Id.
27. 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 5.03A, at 5-11
(20(101).
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thus, the owner of the copyright of the work.28 This is "an exception
to the rule that copyright ownership vests initially in the work's crea-
tor."'29 In fact, the United States may be the only country that permits
a creator's employer to "obtain authorship status of the work. '' 30 The
notion that ownership rights should vest with the employer in a work-
for-hire situation is well established in Copyright law. 31 Labeling a
creation as a work made for hire carries great implications for the
artist and her employer. 32 Work-for-hire status affects the term of the
copyright, the owner's renewal rights, and the owner's termination
rights. 33 In addition, only a copyright owner can sue for infringement;
therefore, in a work-for-hire situation, the employer is the only party
allowed to sue an infringing party.34 Under the Act, a work made for
hire consists of either a creation prepared by an employee in the scope
of his employment, or a creation that fits within the identified catego-
ries of commissioned works.35
1. The Employer-Employee Prong of the Works Made for Hire
Definition
While the Act states that a work made for hire is a work made by an
employee during the scope of his employment, neither the statute nor
its legislative history sets out guidelines to determine who qualifies as
an employee. 36 For many years, it had been the general consensus
that Congress' use of the term "employee" was meant to indicate a
28. 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1994). Section 201 of the Act states, "In the case of a work made for
hire, the employer or other person for whom the work was prepared is considered the author for
purposes of [the Act]." Id.
29. ROCHELLE COOPER DREYFUSS & ROBERTA ROSENTHAL KWALL, INrELLECTUAL PROP-
ERTY 318 (1996).
30. Id.
31. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 121 (1976).
32. Chau Vo, Finding a Workable Exception to the Work Made for Hire Presumption of Own-
ership, 32 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 611, 615 (1999).
33. Id. For example, the copyright duration for a work-for-hire is either ninety-five years
from publication or 120 years from creation, whichever expires first. 17 U.S.C. § 302(c) (1994).
34. Vo, supra note 32, at 615.
35. Prior to the 1999 Sound Recording Amendment, section 101 of the Act defined a work
made for hire as:
A work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her employment; or a work
specially ordered or commissioned for use as a contribution to a collective work, as a
part of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, as a translation, as a supplementary
work, as a compilation, as an instructional text, as a test, as answer material for a test,
or as an atlas, if the parties expressly agree in a written instrument signed by them that
the work shall be considered a work made for hire.
17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
36. 1 NIMMER, supra note 27, § 5.03[B][1], at 5-14; Community for Creative Non-Violence et
al. v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 742 (1989).
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"salaried worker in a long term position." 37 However, in 1989, the
Supreme Court of the United States set a standard for determining
when a hired party can be considered an employee in Community for
Creative Non-Violence v. Reid.38
a. Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid 39
In Reid, the Court applied principles of agency to determine
whether the hired party was an employee under the meaning of the
statute.40 The Court relied on a federal common law rule of agency as
opposed to state agency laws because of the Act's "express objective
of creating national, uniform copyright law."'41
Reid involved a dispute over a sculpture created for the plaintiff by
the defendant, a non-profit organization that benefited the home-
less. 42 A dispute over the copyright ownership ensued when the plain-
tiff, the Community for Creative Non-Violence (CCNV), wanted to
take the sculpture on tour.43 Reid, the artist, objected to the tour and
claimed that the sculpture would not be able to withstand extensive
traveling. 44 CCNV and Snyder, one of CCNV's trustees, eventually
filed suit against Reid, seeking reacquisition of the sculpture and a
ruling on who owned the copyright. 45 The Court listed a number of
factors (Reid factors) taken from the Restatement of Agency46 to de-
termine whether Reid was an employee of CCNV.47 The Court
stated:
In determining whether a hired party is an employee under the gen-
eral common law of agency, we consider the hiring party's right to
control the manner and means by which the product is accom-
plished. Among other factors relevant to this inquiry are the skill
required; the source of the instrumentalities and tools; the location
of the work; the duration of the relationship between the parties;
37. Jessica D. Litman, Copyright, Compromise and Legislative History, 72 CORNELL L. REV.
857, 890 (1987).
38. 490 U.S. 730 (1989).
39. 490 U.S. 730 (1989).
40. Reid, 490 U.S. at 740. The Court stated that in the past they had "concluded that Congress
intended terms such as 'employee' and 'employer"' to be examined under agency law. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 735.
44. Id. Reid then went on to file for a copyright registration for the sculpture and, in turn,
CCNV filed a competing registration. Reid, 490 U.S. at 735.
45. Id. It is important to note that the ownership of the sculpture itself was never an issue in
this case, as it was the property of CCNV. Id. The ownership of the work and of the copyright
are separate and distinct from one another. Id.
46. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220.
47. Reid, 490 U.S. at 751-52.
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whether the hiring party has the right to assign additional projects
to the hired party; the extent of the hired party's discretion over
when and how long to work; the method of payment; the hired
party's role of hiring and paying assistants; whether the work was
part of the normal business of the hiring party; whether the hiring
party is in business; the provision of employee benefits; and the tax
treatment of the hired party.48
After considering these factors, the Court determined that Reid was
an independent contractor, not an employee of CCNV.49 The first
factor that the Court considered was CCNV's right to control the
work. 50 The Court focused on the right to control the production pro-
cess, not the product itself.5' Both parties agreed that the sculpture
was to be made of Cast 62, a synthetic substance that would allow the
project to fit within CCNV's budget.52 Snyder and other CCNV mem-
bers visited Reid to check on the progress of the work and Snyder
made suggestions to Reid on the model of the sculpture. 53
Although CCNV did control some aspects of the sculpture, the
amount of control a party exercises over the project is not disposi-
tive.54 In fact, the other factors used by the Court to determine the
ownership of the sculpture weighed in Reid's favor.55 Reid was a
sculptor, which the Court considered to be a "highly skilled profes-
sion."'56 In addition, he provided his own materials and worked out of
his own studio.57 These facts demonstrated that Reid controlled the
process used to create the work. The sculpture was not part of
CCNV's regular business, and CCNV did not pay Reid any benefits
nor did it withhold any taxes. 58 These facts demonstrated that a typical
employer-employee relationship did not exist. 59 After an analysis of
the factors, the Court concluded that Reid was in fact an independent
48. Id. at 751.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Corey L. Wishner, Whose Work is it Anyway?: Revisiting Community for Creative Non-
Violence v. Reid in Defining the Employer-Employee Relationship Under the "Work Made for
Hire" Doctrine, 12 HOFSTRA LAB. AND EMP. L.J. 393, 403 (1995) (citing I NIMMER, supra note
27, § 5.03 [Bl[11[a] at 5-22).
52. Reid, 490 U.S. at 734.
53. Id.
54. Wishner, supra note 51, at 403; see also 1 NIMMER, supra note 27, § 5.03 [B][1][al, at 5-22.
55. Reid, 490 U.S. at 751.
56. Id. at 752.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 753. In addition, the Court considered the fact that CCNV had no right to assign
any other projects to Reid and that they paid Reid a $15,000 lump sum "dependant on comple-
tion of a specific job." Id.
59. Id.
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contractor of CCNV.60 Therefore, the sculpture could not be consid-
ered a work made for hire, and CCNV could not be an author of the
work. 6'
In Reid, the Court intended to clarify Congress' main purpose in
revising the Act, which was "enhancing predictability and certainty of
copyright ownership. '62 However, by using this list of factors, the
Court established a test that was highly fact specific. The Court indi-
cated that no one factor was dispositive, but it gave no direction on
how to weigh all of the factors.63 Therefore, the Court failed in its
attempt to establish predictability within the Act.64
b. Aymes v. Bonelli65
In 1992, the United States Court of Appeals of the Second Circuit
elaborated on the application of the Reid factors in Aymes v. Bonelli.
In Aymes, the plaintiff appealed a district court ruling that the com-
puter program he designed while working for the defendant was a
work made for hire.66 The district court dismissed Aymes' claim for
copyright infringement against the defendant, Island Recreational. 67
The Second Circuit stated that even though no Reid factor was dis-
positive, not all factors were equally important.68 "The factors should
not merely be tallied but should be weighed according to their signifi-
cance in [that specific] case."' 69 The Second Circuit stated that while
some factors would generally be insignificant, others would be impor-
tant in a majority of cases. 70 These important factors included: "(1)
the hiring party's right to control the manner and means of the crea-
60. Reid, 490 U.S. at 753.
61. Id. While the Court held that CCNV was not an author of the work by virtue of the work-
for-hire provision, it did uphold the decision of the United States Court of Appeals to remand
the case to the district court to determine whether CCNV was a joint author of the work. Id.
The district court had to decide whether CCNV and Reid created the work "with the intention
that their contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole."
Id. (citing 17 U.S.C. § 101). If that were the case, then Reid and CCNV would share ownership
of the copyright. Id.
62. Id. at 750.
63. Reid, 490 U.S. at 752; Aymes v. Bonelli, 980 F.2d 857, 861 (2d Cir. 1992).
64. 1 NIMMER, supra note 27, § 5.03 [B][l][a], at 5-27.
65. 980 F.2d 857 (2d Cir. 1992).
66. Aymes, 980 F.2d at 858. According to the facts set out by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit, the work in question was a series of computer programs called
"CSALIB" that Aymes designed under the direction of Bonelli during his two years of work for
Island. Id. at 859.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Aymes, 980 F.2d at 861.
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tion; (2) the skill required; (3) the provision of employee benefits; (4)
the tax treatment of the hired party; and (5) whether the hiring party
has the right to assign other projects to the hired party."'7 1 The Sec-
ond Circuit put more weight on these five factors because they would
most likely be determinative of the "nature of the employment rela-
tionship" in question. 72 As a result, the Second Circuit created a
somewhat structured approach to determining how to weigh the Reid
factors in a given case. 73 After applying this balancing test, the Sec-
ond Circuit overruled the district court's determination that Aymes'
computer program was a work made for hire. 74
c. Scope of Employment
Once a court establishes that the hired party is an employee, it must
determine whether the work in question was prepared within the
scope of that person's employment. Courts have looked to the Re-
statement of Agency for guidelines in determining whether an em-
ployee's work was created within the scope of his employment. 75 The
work falls under the scope of the employee's employment when: "(1)
[i]t is of the kind of work he is employed to perform; (2) [i]t occurs
substantially within authorized work hours and office; (3) [i]t is actu-
ated at least in part by a purpose to serve the employer. '76 A person
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 862. The court should address the five factors enumerated in the case, as they will
most likely be relevant in every case. Id. The court should then address the remaining factors in
the order of their relevance. Id.; Wishner, supra note 47, at 401.
74. Aymes, 980 F.2d at 862. The court put extra weight on the fact that Island did not pay
payroll taxes or benefits for Aymes. Id. The court stated that type of behavior was a "virtual
admission" that the hired party was an independent contractor and not an employee. Id. The
Second Circuit in Aymes listed the following cases as examples of cases that had used balancing
tests in applying the Reid factors: Marco v. Accent Publishing Co., 969 F.2d 1547 (3d Cir. 1992)
(establishing that photographer was independent contractor using only some of the Reid factors
and ignoring others because they were "indeterminate"); M.G.B. Homes, Inc. v. Ameron Homes,
Inc., 903 F.2d 1486 (11th Cir. 1990) (holding that a drafting service was an independent contrac-
tor using only a few of the Reid factors); MacLean Assocs., Inc. v. Win. M. Mercer-Meidinger-
Hansen, Inc., 952 F.2d 769 (3d Cir. 1991) (finding that a computer programmer could be an
independent contractor). Aymes, 980 F.2d at 862. But see 1 NIMMER, supra note 27,
§ 5.03[B][l][a], at 5-27 (criticizing the approach taken by the Second Circuit in Aymes). Profes-
sor Nimmer states that there is some merit to the Second Circuit's reasoning that the Reid fac-
tors are not all equal; however, he feels that it is unlikely that the same five factors listed in
Aymes would always be accorded the most significance in every case. Id. at 5-29. He further
argues that the Second Circuit's approach directly conflicts with the Supreme Court's decision in
Reid because the Supreme Court stressed the importance of considering every factor as it re-
lated to the facts of the case. Id.
75. 1 NIMMER, supra note 27, § 5.03[B][1][b], at 5-33.
76. 1 NIMMER, supra note 27, § 5.03 [B][1][b], at 5-33; see also City of Newark v. Beasley, 883
F. Supp. 3, 7 (D.N.J. 1995).
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is working within the scope of her employment when she is "acting
under the direction and supervision of the hiring author, at the hiring
author's instance and expense. '77 It is irrelevant if the creator has a
typical employee relationship with the hiring party.78 Therefore, even
if a hired party is an employee, his creation does not necessarily have
to be considered a work made for hire.
2. The Commissioned Works Prong of the Works-for-hire
Definition
A work created by an independent contractor can also be a work
made for hire if it fits within one of the specially enumerated catego-
ries provided in the statutory definition. 79 Before the Supreme Court
decision in Reid, courts had varying interpretations of the commis-
sioned works paragraph in the works made for hire definition.80
While some courts followed the reasoning that paragraph two of the
works made for hire definition was "the exclusive provision governing
commissioned works,"8' the Second Circuit took a different ap-
proach. 82 In Reid, the Supreme Court invalidated the Second Cir-
cuit's approach by deciding that Congress intended the two sections of
the works-for-hire definition to be "mutually exclusive ways for works
to acquire work-for-hire status. 8s3 The first section applied to em-
ployees, while the second section applied to independent
contractors. 8
4
77. Marci A. Hamilton, Commissioned Works as Works Made for Hire Under the 1976 Copy-
right Act: Misinterpretation and Injustice, 135 U. PA. L. Ri-v. 1281, 1299 (1987).
78. Id. In City of Newark v. Beasley, the district court stated that all three of the factors must
be found in order to label a work as a work-for-hire. City of Newark, 883 F. Supp. at 7; see also I
NIMMER, supra note 27, § 5.03 [B][1][b], at 5-33.
79. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
80. 1 NIMMER, supra note 27, § 5.03[B][1][a], at 5-22.
81. Hamilton, supra note 77, at 1296-97. See also Meltzer v. Zoller, 520 F. Supp. 847, 857
(D.N.J. 1981) (holding that architectural drawings done by an independent contractor did not
qualify for work-for-hire status because architectural drawings were not included within one of
the enumerated categories set out in the work-for-hire definition in section 101 of the Act);
Mister B. Textiles, Inc. v. Woodcrest Fabrics, Inc. 523 F. Supp. 21 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (holding that
fabric design did not fit within one of the enumerated categories in the work-for-hire definition),
as cited in Hamilton, supra note 77, at 1296-1297.
82. In Aldon Accessories Ltd. v. Spiegel, Inc., 738 F.2d 548 (2d Cir. 1984), cert denied, 469 U.S.
982 (1984), the Second Circuit held that both sections of the work made for hire definition
applied to independent contractors. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
stated that section two of the works-for-hire definition only applied when the hiring party con-
tributed little to the creative process, but section one applied when the hiring party did supervise
the work of the hired party. Id. at 552. See also Hamilton, supra note 77, at 1300.
83. Community for Creative Non-Violence et al. v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 748 (1989).
84. Id.
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The Act's legislative history shows that the status of commissioned
works as works made for hire was highly debated throughout the crea-
tion of the Act.85 The categories of commissioned works arose from a
compromise between authors' representatives and publishers within
the motion picture industry.8 6 These categories, prior to the 1999
sound recording amendment, included: a contribution to a collective
work; a part of a motion picture or other audio visual work; a transla-
tion; a supplementary work; a compilation; an instructional text; a test;
answer material for a test; and an atlas.8 7 If the work in question does
not fit within one of the specific categories mentioned in the statute,
then it cannot be a work made for hire even if it had been specially
commissioned. 88
Additionally, commissioned works that fit within one of these enu-
merated categories will only be considered a work-for-hire if there is a
signed agreement between the parties designating the work as such.89
This writing requirement is only in effect for specially ordered or com-
missioned works; works created by an employee within the scope of
his employment do not require a written agreement. 90 "The purpose
of the writing requirement is not only to protect people against false
claims of oral agreements, but also to make the ownership of property
rights in intellectual property clear and definite, so that such property
will be readily marketable." 9' The written agreement must be signed
by both parties in order to be valid 92 and must sufficiently designate
85. H.R. RFP. No. 94-1476, at 121 (1976). At one point, screenwriters and composers for
movies proposed a provision that would allow the commissioning party to acquire the right to
use the commissioned work to the extent necessary in their regular course of business, but allow
the hired party to keep the other rights in the work. Id. This provision, which in theory would
have increased the bargaining power of artists, was rejected by the legislators because they felt
that, in practice, the possibility of any real benefit to the artists was minimal. Id.
86. Litman, supra note 37, at 890-91. The authors' representatives were concerned that free-
lance authors lacked the amount of bargaining power necessary to turn down contract provisions
that labeled the works as works made for hire. Id. However, publishers and movie studios were
concerned about the implication of the termination provisions on works that were created by
independent contractors, but had a history of being labeled works made for hire. Id. "These
groups compromised by limiting commissioned works-for-hire status to the specific classes of
works typically created by multiple authors." Id.
87. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
88. 1 NIMMER, supra note 27, § 5.03[B][2][a], at 5-38.
89. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994); Wishner, supra note 51, at 411.
90. 1 NIMMER, supra note 27, § 5.03[B][2][b], at 5-40; Wishner, supra note 51, at 411.
91. Oversight Hearing on the United States Copyright Office and the Issue of Sound Recordings
as Works Made for Hire: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property of
the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 14 (2000) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of Professor Paul Gold-
stein), citing Schiller & Schmidt, Inc. v. Nordisco Corp., 969 F.2d 410, 411 (7th Cir. 1992) (hold-
ing that photographs that were specially ordered were not works made for hire because the
agreement designating them as such was not signed by both parties).
92. 1 NIMMER, supra note 27, § 5.03[B][2][b], at 5-39; see also Schiller, 969 F.2d at 411.
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the works in question as works made for hire. 93 If a work falls within
one of the enumerated categories of commissioned works eligible for
work-for-hire status and there is a signed writing, then the work cre-
ated by an independent contractor will be a work made for hire under
the Act. 94
B. Termination Rights
Whether a copyright owner can utilize the termination rights pro-
vided by the Act depends upon whether her work qualifies as a work
made for hire. Section 203 of the Act provides authors with the op-
portunity to terminate any exclusive or nonexclusive transfer of their
work executed after January 1, 1978.95 This termination may take
place any time during a period of five years, beginning at the end of a
thirty-five year period from the date of the execution of the grant.96
An author must serve notice of the termination, and this notice must
be served no less than two and no more than ten years before the
termination date. 97 Once the termination takes effect, all rights that
were covered by the original transfer will revert back to the author. 98
Despite the fact that section 203 has been in effect for more than
twenty years, there is very little case law on the subject because termi-
nation under this provision cannot be executed until 2013, thirty-five
years after the 1978 grants.99 There is, however, a conflict between
93. 1 NIMMER, supra note 27, § 5.03[B][2][b], at 5-40. See Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Dumas,
53 F.3d 549, 560 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1010 (1995). The Second Circuit held that a
check endorsement that only mentioned an "assignment" of the work did not satisfy the written
agreement requirement of the commissioned works provision of the statute. Id. The Second
Circuit also found a legend that confirmed the works were works made for hire would satisfy the
writing requirement as long as it was signed by both parties. Id. The court also remanded the
case to determine whether an agreement signed by an agent could make a work a work made for
hire. Id. at 561. On remand, the district court concluded that there was no evidence to support
the argument that the artist's managers believed that they were authorized to bind the artist to a
work-for-hire agreement. Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Dumas, 960 F. Supp. 710, 721 (S.D.N.Y.
1997).
94. 1 NIMMER, supra note 27, § 5.03[B][2][b], at 5-41.
95. Section 203 provides:
In the case of any work other than a work made for hire, the exclusive or nonexclusive
grant of a transfer or license of copyright or of any right under a copyright, executed by
the author on or after January 1, 1978, otherwise than by will, is subject to termination
if it meets certain conditions.
17 U.S.C. § 203 (1994).
96. 17 U.S.C. § 203 (1994); see generally Kathleen M. Bragg, The Termination of Transfers
Provision of the 1976 Copyright Act: Is It Time to Alienate it or Amend it?, 27 PEPP. L. REv. 769
(2000).
97. 17 U.S.C. § 203 (1994).
98. Id.
99. Id. However, there have been some terminations under section 304, which is the termina-
tion provision for works created before 1976, Section 304 provides authors of a work that was in
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the circuit courts on whether section 203 should be interpreted to
mean that transfers could only be terminated after thirty-five years.1 10
Both the Seventh and Ninth Circuits initially dealt with this matter.
1. Rano v. Sipa 1°'
In Rano v. Sipa, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit held that section 203 of the Act preempted California state
contract law. As a result, transfers of copyrights may only be termi-
nated during the five-year period beginning thirty-five years from the
date of the transfer. 10 2 In Rano, the plaintiff, a professional photogra-
pher, entered into an oral copyright license agreement with the defen-
dant for an unspecified length of time to reproduce, sell, and
distribute his photographs. 10 3 After Rano terminated the license
agreement, the defendant refused to relinquish control of the photos.
Subsequently, Rano sued the defendant for copyright infringement.10 4
The Ninth Circuit interpreted section 203 of the Act to mean that no
licensing agreements are terminable at will before the end of the stat-
utory thirty-five year period, unless the licensing agreement contained
an express provision specifying an earlier termination date. 10 5
2. Walthal v. Rusk 10 6
In contrast, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Cir-
cuit in Walthal v. Rusk held that terminations were allowed under Illi-
its first or renewal term on January 1, 1978, with the right to terminate an exclusive or nonexclu-
sive grant of a transfer or license of the renewal copyright. 17 U.S.C. § 304(c) (1994). This
section allows authors to initiate this termination at any time during a period of five years begin-
ning at the end of fifty-six years from the date the copyright was originally obtained, or begin-
ning January 1, 1978, whichever was later. 17 U.S.C. § 304(c)(3) (1994). Using this provision,
Joseph Simon, the creator of the comic book character Captain America, filed an official termi-
nation notice with the Copyright Office in 1999 to terminate the license he granted to Marvel
Entertainment Group to the character. Wendelyn P. Killian & Leon Liu, Termination Looms in
2013, 23 NAT'L L.J., Oct. 16, 2000, at C1. This notice provided Marvel the two years notice that
is required for termination under the Act. Id. Thus, Mr. Simon should regain his rights to Cap-
tain America in December 2001. Id.
100. 3 NIMMER, supra note 27, § 11.01[B], at 11-4.
101. 987 F.2d 580 (9th Cir. 1993).
102. Rano, 987 F.2d at 585.
103. Id. at 583.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 585. Professor Nimmer has been especially critical of this decision. 3 NIMMER,
supra note 27, § 11.01[B], at 11-4. He stated that the ruling "convert[ed] casual oral permission
into a thirty-five year straitjacket." Id. at 11-7. Professor Nimmer also believed the decision
"convert[ed] an outside deadline designed as the maximum time before which an author must be
allowed to terminate prior grants into a minimum duration of those grants." Id.
106. 172 F.3d 481 (7th Cir. 1999).
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nois law and section 203 does not preempt that termination right. 0 7
In Walthal, the plaintiffs, all of whom were members of the musical
group Butthole Surfers, wanted to terminate their recording agree-
ment with their record company. 0 8 The agreement between the par-
ties consisted only of an oral licensing agreement, so it did not contain
any provisions governing termination rights. 0 9 The plaintiffs at-
tempted to terminate the agreement when the defendant record com-
pany refused to amend the terms of the agreement from a fifty-fifty
division of the royalties to an arrangement in which the band would
receive eighty percent of the royalties." 0 After Butthole Surfers sent
the record company a letter terminating the agreement, the company
continued to make and distribute the group's recordings, so the group
filed a suit for copyright infringement.' 1 The record company argued
that the group's termination of the agreement was ineffective because
it could not terminate for thirty-five years under section 203 of the
Act.' 12
The Seventh Circuit found that the letter terminating the agreement
was valid under Illinois law and that section 203 did not prevent the
group from terminating their deal before the end of the thirty-five
year period.' 13 The court emphasized that the purpose of the termina-
tion rights provision is to protect authors from any unfair transfer of
rights that are due to the unequal bargaining position of the au-
thors.' 14 If the court had interpreted section 203 as requiring transfers
to last thirty-five years and forced Butthole Surfers to remain in their
contract with the record company, the very purpose of the termination
rights provision would have been undermined." t 5
3. Korman v. HBC Florida, Inc."16
Recently, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Cir-
cuit followed the reasoning in Walthal and held that section 203 did
107. Walthal, 172 F.3d at 485.
108. Id. at 482.
109. /d.
110. Id.
Ill. Id.
112. Id. at 483.
113. Walthal, 172 F.3d at 485.
114. Id. at 484.
115. Id. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit criticized the opinion of
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit's Rano stating that the Ninth Circuit's
holding created a situation where "a contract for a specific term of less than 35 years does not
conflict with the 35 year period but a contract which is terminable at will by operation of the law
does." Id. at 485.
116. 182 F.3d 1291 (11th Cir. 1999).
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not require a thirty-five year minimum term for licenses that were cre-
ated for an unspecified duration. 117 In Korman v. HBC Florida, Inc.,
the defendant radio station continued to use jingles that the plaintiff
wrote after she attempted to terminate her license with the station.118
After examining the holdings in both Walthal and Rano, the Eleventh
Circuit followed the Seventh Circuit's approach and held that Korman
could terminate her license with HBC before the end of the thirty-five
year statutory period.119 The Eleventh Circuit concluded, "Section
203 does not say that copyright licenses of indefinite duration cannot
be terminated for thirty-five years. ' 120 In addition, the Eleventh Cir-
cuit stated that "if state law provides that licenses of indefinite dura-
tion may be terminated in less than 35 years, it is state law and not
section 203 that governs the question of termination .. 121
The Seventh and Eleventh Circuits' interpretation of section 203 is
consistent with the purpose of the provision to provide authors with a
second chance to reap the benefits of their work.122 The legislative
history shows that the reasoning behind this provision was the une-
qual bargaining power of authors, which is a direct result of the im-
mense difficulty found in determining the value of a creation before it
has been exploited.'2 3 An interpretation of the termination rights
provision that creates a minimum term for indefinite licenses would
accomplish the exact opposite of that goal. 124 The House Report
states that the provision was not intended to lengthen the duration of
any transfer made for a term of less than thirty five years, 125 recon-
firming that parties were always allowed to create a license for a defi-
nite duration. 126 The view that state laws should govern indefinite
agreements before the end of the thirty-five year statutory period is
more consistent with the legislative purpose of the termination
provision.
It is important to determine whether a particular work is a work
made for hire because the termination rights provided in section 203
117. Id. at 1294.
118. Id. at 1292.
119. Id. at 1294.
120. Id. at 1295.
121. Id. at 1297.
122. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 124 (1976).
123. Id.; see also 3 NIMMER, supra note 27, § 11.01[A], at 11-3 (asserting section 203 is de-
signed to protect authors and to give them a second chance to profit from their works).
124. Walthal v. Rusk, 172 F.3d 481, 485 (7th Cir. 1999).
125. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 128 (1976).
126. Korman, 182 F.3d at 1295.
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are inapplicable to works made for hire. 127 The explicit terms of the
statute exclude works made for hire from section 203.128 Moreover,
parties may not agree that a work is a work made for hire simply to
avoid the termination rights if the parties do not actually have a "for
hire" relationship. 129 If an employer-employee relationship does not
exist between the parties, then the work must fall within one of the
enumerated categories of commissioned works in order for an agree-
ment to have the effect of making the work a work made for hire. 30
"It is the relationship that in fact exists between the parties, and not
their description of that relationship, that is determinative.' t3 1 Simi-
larly, parties may not use an agreement to place a work made for hire
under the termination provisions; however, parties may put some of
their own termination provisions in their employment contract.1 32
Whether a work is considered a work made for hire has a real impact
on the artist's ability to reclaim his rights in the future.
III. THE 1999 AND 2000 AMENDMENTS TO THE COPYRIGHT ACT
A thorough understanding of the work-for-hire and termination
rights provisions in the 1976 Copyright Act (Act) is necessary to com-
prehend the potential impact that the 1999 sound recording amend-
ment could have had on recording artists. In order to further
appreciate the artist community's reaction to this amendment and the
battles that ensued between the record industry and artists over the
change in the law, it is necessary to examine the legislative history and
reasoning behind the first works made for hire amendment in 1999,
which added sound recordings to the list of works eligible for work-
for-hire status. These battles led to the compromises made between
artists and the recording industry that led to the 2000 Work Made for
Hire and Copyright Corrections Act, which effectively repealed the
1.999 amendment.
127. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 125 (1976). The fact that the termination rights do not apply
to works made for hire was one of the main reasons the definition of works made for hire was so
important during the creation of the Act. Id.
128. Section 203 begins, "In the case of any work other than a work made for hire .... 17
U.S.C. § 203 (1994).
129. 3 NIMMER, supra note 27, § 11.02[A][21, at 11-11.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 11-11 to 11-12.
132. Id. at 11-12.
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A. The 1999 Work Made for Hire Amendment
There have always been questions surrounding the protection of
sound recordings 33 under copyright law.1 34 The Act did not provide
any protection for sound recordings until 1971, long after artists such
as the Beatles and Elvis had become popular. 135 The Act's legislative
history defends the protection of sound recordings as a class, stating
that they are "writings of an author capable of protection under the
Constitution." 136 On November 29, 1999, President Clinton signed
into law the Satellite Home Viewer Improvement Act,137 which was
attached to the federal omnibus spending bill. 138 In total, the omnibus
bill contained 1,174 pages, 39 and hidden among the pages was a four-
line "technical amendment" to the Act that may have changed the
recording industry forever.1 40 The wording of the amendment was
simple: "Work Made for Hire - § 101 of title 17, United States Code, is
amended in the definition relating to work-for-hire in paragraph (2)
by inserting 'as a sound recording,' after 'audiovisual work."1 41 This
amendment, in theory, added sound recordings to the list of commis-
sioned or specially ordered works that could be considered works
made for hire. The legislative history available on this provision de-
133. Sound recordings, as defined in section 101 of the Act, are "works that result from the
fixation of a series of musical, spoken, or other sounds, but not including the sounds accompany-
ing a motion picture or other audiovisual work, regardless of the nature of the material objects,
such as disks, tapes, or other phonorecords, in which they are embodied." 17 U.S.C. § 101
(1994).
134. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476 at 56 (1976). It must be noted that the copyright for a sound
recording is separate and distinct from the copyright in the musical composition. 1 NIMMER,
supra note 27, § 2.10. Similarly, ownership of the copyright of a sound recording does not trans-
late into the ownership of the actual master containing the recording. Id.
135. See generally H.R. REP. No. 92-487, 2d Cong., 1st Sess., at 5 (1971).
136. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476 at 56 (1976). The legislative history of the 1976 Act states that
"the copyright protection that would prevent the reproduction and distribution of unauthorized
phonorecords of sound recordings is clearly justified," and "too long delayed." Id. However,
sound recording owners do not receive as much protection under the Act as other copyright
owners because they do not have the benefit of public performance rights. 17 U.S.C. § 114(a)
(1994). Sound recording owners also get a lower degree of protection because they have to show
actual reproduction of a recording in order to succeed in an infringement action. 17 U.S.C.
§ 114(b) (1994).
137. The Satellite Home Viewer Improvement Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113 Appendix l,
§ 1011(d), 13 Stat. 1501, (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994 & Supp. V 1999)), repealed by Work
Made for Hire and Copyright Corrections Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-379 (2000).
138. Bill Holland, Acts' Reps Decry C'right Clause, BILLBOARD, Jan. 15, 2000, at 75.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. The Satellite Home Viewer Improvement Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113 Appendix I,
§ 1011(d), 113 Stat. 1501, (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994 & Supp. V 1999)), repealed by Work
Made for Hire and Copyright Corrections Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-379 (2000).
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scribes the amendment as a "technical and clarifying change" 142 be-
cause sound recordings had been registered in the Copyright Office as
works made for hire since they were eligible for protection. 143 Addi-
tionally, Senator Trent Lott claimed that the amendment would not
imply that sound recordings could not qualify as works made for hire
before the amendment took effect. 144
Noting the limited legislative history on the provision, it is no sur-
prise that the artist community had no knowledge of the amendment
until it was too late. The amendment was discovered by lobbyists
from the American Federation of Television and Radio Artists after it
was too late to contest it.145 The lobbyists did not discover the amend-
ment until it was placed in the conference report, which cannot be
amended. 146 The reason it took the lobbyists so long to find the
amendment was that no Congressional hearings on the matter oc-
curred because a congressional staffer had labeled the amendment as
a technical correction. 147  By labeling the change as a technical
amendment, Congress did not allow the artists to express their con-
cerns over the issue.' 48 Had Congress held public hearings on the
matter, the artist community would have argued that the amendment
was a substantive change in the law. 149 The artist community feared
that the amendment would destroy any of the termination rights they
owned under section 203 of the Act.' 50 Many recording artists looked
forward to 2013 as the year they would be able to begin to reclaim the
142. 145 CONG. REC. S14696, 14712 (Nov. 17, 1999); Copyright Act is Amended to Make
Sound Recordings Eligible for Classification as Works Made for Hire, 21 No. 9 ENT. L. REP.,
Feb., 2000, at 8.
143. 145 CONG. REC. S14696, 14712 (Nov. 17, 1999); Geoffrey Hull, Copyright Act Amend-
ment Seen as Blow to Artists' Sound Recording Rights, 15 ENT. L. FIN. 1 (2000).
144. 145 CONG. REC. S14712 (Nov. 17, 1999).
145. Holland, supra note 138, at 75.
146. Id.
147. Bill Holland, Work-For-Hire Provision Sparks Artist Furor, Demand For Change, BILL-
BOARD, Jan. 22, 2000, at 122.
148. Holland, supra note 12, at 112. In general, a proposed law that causes a substantive
change to the rights of others would be subject to debate or hearings in both chambers of Con-
gress. Id. The reason the sound recording amendment avoided such debate was that it was
introduced as a technical amendment. Id. As a general rule, technical amendments are used to
make corrections to the wording of a law or to correct minor problems. Id. An amendment
must be noncontroversial in nature in order to meet the definition of a technical amendment. Id.
149. Holland, supra note 138, at 75.
150. As stated previously, works made for hire do not qualify for the termination rights in
section 203 of the Act. See supra notes 127-132 and accompanying text. Artists claimed that by
adding sound recordings to the list of works that qualify as works made for hire, this amendment
effectively stripped them of the future ability to reclaim ownership of their copyrighted record-
ings. Holland, supra note 138, at 75; Holland, supra note 147, at 122.
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rights in their recordings. 151 On the other hand, the recording indus-
try would have argued that the amendment had no substantive effect
on the law because sound recordings had always been considered
works made for hire.' 52 Even though the artists did not have an op-
portunity to voice their concerns over the amendment before it was
passed, they immediately came together to oppose it once the amend-
ment was discovered.
Adding to the artist community's frustration over the issue was the
revelation that the sound recording amendment was not requested by
a member of Congress.1 53 Instead, it was apparently entered by a con-
gressional staffer into the final conference report of the Satellite
Home Viewer Improvement Act at the request of the Recording In-
dustry Association of America (RIAA). 54 Coincidentally, that
staffer has since taken a position as a lobbyist for the RIAA. 55
Both the staffer and the RIAA stated that the amendment was nec-
essary as a clarifying amendment to ensure that recording artists were
protected under the Cyber-Piracy Prevention Act.' 56 In fact, the
staffer who entered the amendment into the conference report
worked on the Cyber-Piracy Prevention Act, which prohibited the
practice of cybersquatting. t 57 Musician Don Henley, who helped cre-
151. Holland, supra note 12, at 112.
152. See Hull, supra note 143, at 1. The Record Industry claimed that this was just a technical
amendment because sound recordings had been registered as works made for hire already. Id.
While the fact that the Copyright Office had been registering sound recordings as works-for-hire
does create prima facie evidence that the recordings are works-for-hire, it is a rebuttable pre-
sumption due to the factual nature of the question. Id.
153. Holland, supra note 138, at 75.
154. Holland, supra note 13, at 96. This charge has been disputed by Representative Howard
Coble, who stated that two staffers discussed the issue with the committee a few days before the
end of the conference and it was discussed by the entire conference staff. Hearings, supra note
91, at 14. However, Representative Rick Boucher, a member of the House subcommittee, has
been quoted as claiming that he knew nothing about the amendment. Holland, supra note 13, at
96. He stated that a staff member could have mistakenly inserted the provision without consult-
ing any of the conference members. Id.
155. Holland, supra note 13, at 96.
156. Holland, supra note 12, at 111. The Cyber-Piracy Prevention Act was passed within the
same Satellite Home Viewer Improvement Act as the Sound Recording Amendment. 145
CONG. REC. S14696, 14714 (Nov. 19, 1999). The bill was created to end cybersquatting, the
practice of registering domain names of people or companies with the intent to sell the domain
names back to that person or company for a profit. Id. The legislation provides a limited excep-
tion for domain names that includes the names of copyrighted works, such as audiovisual works,
sound recordings, and books. Id. In addition, the Act states that a person who in good faith
registers a domain name consisting of the name of another living person shall not be liable if that
name is affiliated with or related to a work of authorship protected under the Act. Id. Such
protected works include a work made for hire if the person registering the name is the copyright
owner or licensee of the work. 145 CONG. REC. HI 1769, 11779 (Nov. 19, 1999).
157. Holland, supra note 13, at 96.
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ate the Cyber-Piracy Prevention Act, stated that he had never heard
that a change to the Act was necessary to ensure that artists and sound
recordings were protected from cybersquatting. 58
In addition, there is some evidence that the RIAA, despite their
statements to the contrary, had been lobbying for an amendment of
this kind for years. 159 In 1990, the Register of Copyright, while dis-
cussing a pending bill that proposed to make computer software pro-
grams eligible for work-for-hire status, suggested that sound
recordings also be added to the list of commissioned works that could
be eligible as work-for-hire. 60 The former senior vice-president and
general counsel for the RIAA wrote to the Register of Copyright re-
garding the record industry's view on the bill.' 6' The RIAA believed
that because sound recordings were already considered works-for-
hire, a "clarifying amendment" would be the best way to remedy the
problem. 162 Before the 1999 amendment, the RIAA had never suc-
ceeded in pushing their proposed amendment through Congress. 63 It
should be noted that Hilary Rosen, the president and CEO of the
RIAA, denied that the RIAA made prior requests for a work-for-hire
amendment. 64 Ms. Rosen was adamant in her claim that the 1999
amendment was only a result of the exceptions created for works
made for hire in the Cyber-Piracy Prevention Act. 165
158. Holland, supra note 147, at 122.
159. Bill Holland, Work-For-Hire Repeal Near?: RIAA's Involvement Goes Back 10 Years,
BILLBOARD, July 29, 2000, at 103.
160. Randy S. Frisch & Matthew J. Fortnow, Termination of Copyrights in Sound Recordings:
Is There a Leak in the Record Company Vaults?, 17 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 211, 234 (1993). It
is important to note that this article was the first article to examine the record industry's
problems with termination rights.
161. Id. at 234. Mr. Leibowitz, the RIAA representative, realized that if an amendment ad-
ding sound recordings to the list of commissioned works eligible for work-for-hire status were
passed, it would only restrict the artists' termination rights for recordings made after the amend-
ment was passed. Id. It would not limit termination rights for recordings made prior to the
amendment. Id.; see also Holland, supra note 159, at 103 (discussing the RIAA's past requests
for the amendment).
162. Holland, supra note 159, at 103. RIAA felt that the clarifying amendment would demon-
strate that sound recordings were in fact always works-for-hire, so no artist would be able to
terminate their assignments of rights. Id.
163. See Frisch, supra note 160, at 234.
164. Hilary Rosen, The Letter that Billboard Refused to Print, at http://www.riaa.com/News-
Story.cfm?id=274 (Jan. 12, 2100). Hilary Rosen stated, in a letter to Billboard, which the maga-
zine refused to print, that the RIAA had not attempted to sneak the amendment in to the bill,
nor had they ever sought to change the work-for-hire definition before. Id.
165. Id. It is interesting to note that this is not the first time the RIAA has been accused of
successfully lobbying to add a last-minute amendment to a bill that adversely effects recording
artists. Justin Pritchard, Striking a Chord with Congress, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 19, 1998, at 8D. In-
cluded in the Consumer Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994 was a provision specifically aimed at
preventing artists from filing for bankruptcy in order to be excused from their contracts. H.R.
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Regardless of the potentially honorable reasons of the RIAA in re-
questing the amendment, artists felt that they had a right to voice their
opinions on the possible effects that the amendment would have on
their future termination rights. After months of battling with Con-
gress and the recording industry, artists were finally given their
chance. Representative Howard Coble, the Chairman of the House
Courts and Intellectual Property Subcommittee, set up an oversight
hearing to examine the claims of the artists.1 66 The decision to have
the oversight hearing was a victory for the recording artists, as it
marked the first time that they had successfully banded together to
fight for their rights on Capitol Hill. 167 It is a common misconception
that the RIAA represents the interests of the artists; instead, the
RIAA's main concerns lie with the record companies.1 68 Many record
CONF. REP. No. 105-794 at 102 (1998); David C. Norrell, The Strong Getting Stronger: Record
Labels Benefit from Proposed Changes to the Bankruptcy Code, 19 LOY L.A. ENT. L.J. 445, 446
(1999). Section 365 of the Federal Bankruptcy Code allows debtors to become free from con-
tracts that impair their ability to relieve themselves of debt. 11 U.S.C. § 365 (1994). A few
artists, including Toni Braxton and TLC, had successfully used this provision to threaten to leave
their record contracts in order to negotiate a better deal. Anita M. Samuels & Diana B. Hen-
riques, Going Broke and Cutting Loose; Bankruptcy Has New Appeal for Music Groups Chafing
at Their Contracts, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 1996, at D1. In response to this growing trend, the RIAA
attempted to have the amendment passed. Justin Pritchard, Striking a Chord with Congress,
L.A. TIMES, Aug. 19, 1998, at 8D. Although, Congress never passed the amendment, artist rep-
resentatives were concerned with the RIAA's ability to lobby for an amendment inserted with-
out any Congressional hearings on the matter. Id. In this instance, it was a Congressman who
entered the provision into the bill, instead of a staffer, but that Congressman had received a
$3,000 contribution from the RIAA's political action committee. Id.
166. Holland, supra note 12, at 112. The battle among the RIAA, Congress, and the artists at
times became very animated. Representative Coble first included the following derogatory
statement towards Mr. Henley in the written version of his opening statement for the hearing:
I would like to close by delivering a Valentine to Mr. Don Henley, one of the more
conspicuous critics of this Subcommittee's work. Instead of attending the hearing to-
day, he has chosen to promote his new album .... Mr. Henley, if you are within the
sound of my voice, I hope you get Carpal tunnel syndrome from counting all the money
you make, compliments of the Copyright Act and the Congress who wrote it.
Hearings, supra note 90, at 14 (statement of Representative Howard Coble, Chairman).
Although Mr. Coble never orally made the statement, it was printed in various reports cover-
ing the hearing. Hearings, supra note 90, at 14 (statement of Representative Coble, Chairman);
see also Holland, supra note 13, at 101 (discussing the animosity between the parties). The battle
continued when Mr. Henley responded to the statement by stating that Coble had "aided and
abetted the film studios and the record companies in perpetuating the plantation mentality that
has forever plagued our industry." Holland, supra note 13, at 101. Eventually, the war of words
began to cool down, and Mr. Henley offered Mr. Coble an "olive branch." which Coble said he
would accept as long as Mr. Henley did not "shove it in his ear." Id.
167. Id.
168. Artists' Write-In Requests To Repeal Amendment, BILLBOARD, June 10, 2000, at 96. Pop-
ular recording artist Billy Joel has stated, "RIAA does not represent me, nor does it represent
any other recording artists that I know. The RIAA is nothing more and nothing less than the
representative of the major record companies." Id.
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industry representatives had lobbyists to fight for them on the Hill, 69
therefore, it was important for the artists to create a group that would
look out for their best interests. In an attempt to level the playing
field, musical artists Don Henley and Sheryl Crow co-founded the Re-
cording Artists' Coalition (Coalition), a lobbying group made up of
musical artists and managers.' 70 As of July 29, 2000, the Coalition had
already enlisted forty-four musical performers as members. 171
The Coalition was not the only group represented at the May 25,
2000 oversight hearing. Other people who gave testimony included:
Hilary Rosen, the CEO of RIAA; Marybeth Peters, the Register of
Copyrights; and Michael Greene, President of the National Academy
for Recording Arts and Sciences. 72 In addition, law professors testi-
fied as to the impact of the amendment on artists' rights. 173 The sub-
committee also received a letter signed by twenty-seven copyright law
professors from universities such as Harvard, NYU, and Berkeley,
stating that sound recordings were not considered works-for-hire
before the new law. 174 The hearing proved to be successful for the
artists, as many members of the committee immediately began to pro-
mote a repeal of the 1999 amendment. 75 Just two months later, rep-
resentatives of the RIAA and the recording artist community began
to create a bill that would be an agreeable compromise between the
two groups. 76
169. Holland, supra note 159, at 103. The RIAA has their own lobby group in Washington,
D.C., as well as Seagram's Universal Music Group (UMG), Warner Music, and Sony Music. Id.
In fact, the RIAA "spent just over $1 million on lobbying in 1999, with $500,000 of that going to
law and lobbying firms." Shawn Zeller, Lobbying, 32 NAT'L J. 3668 (Nov. 18, 2000). In the first
half of 2000, the group spent an additional $300,000 on outside lobbying groups. Id.
170. Holland, supra note 13, at 96.
171. Holland, supra note 159, at 103. Besides Sheryl Crow and Don Henley, other high-pro-
file artists that have joined the Coalition include: R.E.M., Billy Joel, Jimmy Buffet, Bruce Spr-
ingsteen and Dave Matthews. Id.
172. Holland, supra note 13, at 96; see also Hearings, supra note 91, at 53-59 (statement of
Hilary Rosen, CEO of RIAA); Id. at 74-81 (statement of Michael Greene, President of the
National Academy of Recording Arts and Sciences); Id. at 18-42 (statement of Marybeth Peters,
Register of Copyrights).
173. Those professors included Professor Marci Hamilton from Benjamin N. Cordozo School
of Law and Professor Paul Goldstein from Stanford University. Hearings, supra note 91, at 65-
69 (statement of Professor Marci A. Hamilton); Id. at 59-65 (statement of Professor Paul
Goldstein).
174. Peter Jaszi, Letter of Law Professors Opposing Addition of Sound Recordings to Com-
missioned Works Made for Hire Provisions, at http://www.recordingartistscoalition.com/letter.
html (last visited Feb. 28, 2001); see Holland, supra note 13, at 96.
175. Bill Holland, Democrats To Call For Work-For Hire Repeal, BILLBOARD, June 24, 2000,
at 1.
176. Bill Holland, Work-For-Hire Repeal Near?: Steps Taken toward Reversal of New Law,
BILLBOARD, July 29, 2000, at 102.
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At the meeting, the artists' representative not only worked on be-
half of the Coalition, but for groups such as the National Academy of
Recording Arts and Sciences, American Society of Composers Au-
thors and Publishers, Broadcast Music Incorporated, American Feder-
ation of Television and Radio Artists, and American Federation of
Musicians. 177 The negotiations between the industry and the artists
did not always run smoothly. A couple of weeks after the first meet-
ing, the representatives of the RIAA proposed changes that substan-
tially differed from the language agreed upon at the first meeting. 78
The RIAA wanted the new bill to mention that sound recordings
could be eligible for work-for-hire status, but the artists' representa-
tive adamantly disapproved.1 79 Finally, after months of negotiations,
the RIAA and representatives of the recording artists agreed on a
neutral bill that would affectively repeal the 1999 amendment.180
Both groups believed that the agreed upon proposal put them back in
the position they were in before the 1999 amendment. 181
B. The Work Made for Hire and Copyright Corrections Act of 2000
On September 6, 2000, House Representative Howard Coble intro-
duced the new bill as number 5107.182 In his introduction, Mr. Coble
described it as a compromise between the artists and the recording
industry.183 The new bill, entitled the Work Made for Hire and Copy-
right Corrections Act of 2000, stated: "The definition of 'work made
for hire' contained in section 101 of title 17, United States Code, is
amended - (1) in paragraph (2), by striking 'as a sound recording." 184
Part two of that section added a paragraph to the Act to ensure that
neither amendment "would be considered or given any legal signifi-
cance.' 85 The purpose of the bill was to repeal the 1999 amendment
without prejudice, meaning that each party would be in the same legal
177. Id.
178. Bill Holland, Work-For-Hire Talks Stalled, BILLBOARD, Aug. 5, 2000, at 100.
179. Id.
180. Bill Holland, RIAA, Artists Agree On C'Right Language, BILLBOARD, Aug. 19, 2000, at 3.
181. Id.
182. 146 CONG. REC. H7244 (Sept. 19, 2000).
183. Id. Mr. Coble also stated that he still believed that the 1999 amendment was merely
technical, but there was ample evidence to support the artists' point of view as well. Id.
184. 146 CONG. REc. H7771 (Sept. 19, 2000).
185. That paragraph stated:
In determining whether any work is eligible to be considered a work made for hire
under paragraph (2), neither the amendment contained in section 1011(d) of the Intel-
lectual Property and Communications Omnibus Reform Act of 1999. as enacted by
section 1000(a)(9) of Public Law 106-113, nor the deletion of the words added by that
amendment-
(A) shall be considered or otherwise given any legal significance, or
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position they occupied prior to the passage of the 1999 amendment. 186
Both the RIAA and the artist community expressed their support for
the new Work Made for Hire Amendment and agreed that it was im-
portant for them to work together on the issue.187
Because of its bipartisan support, the Work Made for Hire and Cop-
yright Corrections Act of 2000 quickly passed in the house. 18 8 On
September 19, 2000, the bill was approved by the House and sent to
the Senate. 89 The Senate passed the bill on October 12, 2000.190
President Clinton then signed the legislation into law on October 27,
2000.191 With the passage of the amendment, the artists and record
industry are back in the same positions they occupied before the 1999
amendment. 192 However, the question of whether sound recordings
constitute works made for hire remains unanswered.
IV. ANALYSIS: SOUND RECORDINGS AS WORKS MADE FOR HIRE
If Congress initially had conducted a public hearing on the 1999
sound recording amendment, much of the controversy surrounding
the passage of the amendment would have been avoided. Artists
merely wanted the opportunity to voice their opinions on the effects
that the change in the law would have made on their careers.1 93 This
(B) shall be interpreted to indicate congressional disapproval of, or acquiescence
in, any judicial determination,
by the courts or the Copyright Office. Paragraph (2) shall be interpreted as if both
section 2(a)(1) of the Work Made for Hire and Copyright Corrections Act of 2000 and
section 1011(d) of the Intellectual Property and Communications Omnibus Reform Act
of 1999, as enacted by section 1000(a)(9) of Public Law 106-113, were never enacted,
and without regard to any inaction or awareness by the Congress at any time of any
judicial determinations.
146 CONG. REC. H7771 (Sept. 19, 2000).
186. 146 CONG. REC. H7771, 7772 (Sept. 19, 2000). In fact, the bill lists November 29, 1999 as
its effective date in order to eliminate any claim that works created in the period between the
two amendments would be works made for hire. Id.
187. Hilary Rosen, the president and CEO of RIAA, stated, "We said from the beginning we
did not intend to change the law and have worked diligently to assure that the issue of work-for-
hire is resolved without prejudice to anyone's position." Statement of Hilary Rosen on the Work
Made for Hire Legislation, at http://www.riaa.com/NewsStory.cfm?id=333 (last visited Feb. 28,
2001). Sheryl Crow stated, "It shows that at the end of the day the system does work if people
will just stay diligent." Bill Holland, Work-For-Hire Rollback Proceeds, BILLBOARD, Sept. 16,
2000, at 89.
188. Holland, supra note 187, at 89. The legislation was co-sponsored by Republicans Howard
Coble and Henry Hyde and Democrats Howard Berman and John Conyers. Id.
189. 146 CONG. REC. H7771, 7772 (Sept. 19, 2000).
190. 146 CONG. REC. S10498 (Oct. 12, 2000).
191. Work Made for Hire and Copyright Corrections Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-379 (2000).
192. Bill Holland, Work-For-Hire Rollback Legislation Ready, BILLBOARD, Sept. 2, 2000, at
101.
193. 146 CONG. REC. H7244, 10499 (Sept. 6, 2(100)
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section will focus on the artists' claim that sound recordings did not
qualify as works made for hire before the 1999 amendment. A com-
parison of the 1999 amendment to other technical amendments will
show that the 1999 amendment was incorrectly labeled as a technical
amendment because it constituted a substantive change in copyright
law.
A. The 1999 Amendment: A Substantive Change in Copyright Law
It was believed at the time the 1999 amendment was passed, that
the addition of sound recordings to the list of commissioned works
eligible for work-for-hire status codified the record companies' ex-
isting practice of registering their ownership of sound recordings as
works made for hire.1 94 However, in order for that to have been the
case, sound recordings would have needed to qualify for work-for-hire
status under either prong of the work-for-hire test. An examination
of the relationship created between record companies and artists as a
result of recording contracts demonstrates that their contractual rela-
tionship does not create an employer-employee relationship. In addi-
tion, sound recordings did not fit under any of the specified "specially
ordered or commissioned works" before Congress added them as a
category in the 1999 amendment. An examination of other technical
amendments passed by Congress proves that the 1999 amendment was
a substantive change in the law.
1. Employer/Employee Relationships
Due to the repeal of the 1999 amendment, it is unclear as to
whether sound recordings created under a typical sound recording
contract qualify as works made for hire. 195 Courts confronted with the
issue of whether a specific sound recording fits within the works made
for hire definition would first have to consider whether there was evi-
dence of an employer-employee relationship between the artist and
the record company.' 96 One major problem is that "there is little di-
rect authority on how the [Reid] test should ... be applied to record-
ing artists. ' 197 Therefore, it is doubtful that the test would be applied
uniformly by the courts, which could lead to a situation where some
194. Id.
195. Hearings, supra note 91, at 90 (statement of Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights).
While most recording contracts contain provisions specifying that the sound recordings are
works made for hire, these statements are not necessarily definitive. Id.
196. Id.
197. Peter Jaszi, Letter of Law Professors Opposing Addition of Sound Recordings to Com-
missioned Works Made for Hire Provisions, at http://www.recordingartistscoalition.com/letter.
html (last visited Jan. 23, 2001).
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artists are considered employees and others are considered indepen-
dent contractors. 98 However, the factors set out by the Supreme
Court in Reid will show that most recording contracts do not make
artists employees of their record companies. 199
a. The Right to Control
The first factor that a court would use to determine whether an em-
ployer-employee relationship was established is the record company's
right to control the process of the creation of the sound recording.200
The effect of this factor depends on the artist's stature in the music
business.20 1 There are many contractual provisions that can be negoti-
ated in order to give an artist more creative control if the artist is
already established in the industry.202
The first provision of a record contract that demonstrates the record
company's right to control the artist is the clause regarding the quality
of the artists' master recording.20 3 Recording contracts will often con-
tain a provision that requires each master to be "commercially satis-
factory"20 4 to the record company. 20 5 This provision establishes more
control for the record companies because they can order an artist to
re-record a song that they feel is not acceptable for commercial re-
lease at the artist's own expense. 20 6 This standard gives the record
company more power over the artists' work because it sets out a
purely subjective standard to determine whether the work is commer-
198. Id.
199. For a list of the Reid factors, see supra note 48 and accompanying text.
200. Community for Creative Non-Violence et al. v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730 (1989); see also Ryan
Ashley Raforth, Limitations of the 1999 Work-For-Hire Amendment: Courts Should Not Con-
sider Sound Recordings to Be Works-For-Hire When Artists' Termination Rights Begin Vesting in
Year 2013, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1021, 1033 (2000).
201. DONALD S. PASSMAN, ALL You NEED To KNOW ABOUT THE Music BUSINESS 107 (4th
ed. 2000). A "new artist" is "someone who has never before had a record deal, or someone who
has been signed [to a deal], but [has] never sold over 250,000 or so albums per release." Id. This
term refers to an artist who was once popular, but has since lost her record deal due to a lack of
success. Id. A "midlevel artist" is someone whose last album sold between 750,000 and
1,500,000 copies. Id. The term "superstar" generally refers to an artist who has sold more than
2.5 million albums. Id. The more established the artist, the more artistic control she will likely
retain over her recordings. See HALLORAN, supra note 2, at 332. On the other hand, a new artist
may have to defer more to the preferences of the record company. Id.; see also Raforth, supra
note 200, at 1033.
202. See HALLORAN, supra note 2, at 326.
203. See Raforth, supra note 200, at 1034.
204. If a record contract requires the artist to deliver commercially satisfactory recordings, it
means that the company only has to accept recordings that it believes it will sell. PASSMAN,
supra note 201, at 124. See generally, Raforth, supra note 200, at 1034.
205. PASSMAN, supra note 201, at 124.
206. Id.
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cially acceptable.20 7 However, most established artists try to negotiate
that the recording must only be "technically satisfactory," meaning
that it merely needs to be recorded in a professional manner.20 This
second provision gives the record companies less control over the
work because they would have to accept the master as long as it was
recorded without technical difficulties. 20 9
Second, a record company may attempt to claim a right of approval
over the songs that will be recorded for an album of a new artist.210
Historically, record companies have deferred to artists' creative deci-
sions, but industry-wide economic problems ended that practice in the
1970s.211 Although it is unlikely that a new artist would be given the
right to select which songs to record without the record company hav-
ing a right of approval, it is generally not disputed which songs should
be recorded.212 In contrast, a more established artist would be more
likely to negotiate for more artistic control over the album. 21 3
A final issue of control between artists and record companies is the
right to name a producer.214 The record producer is generally one of
the most important individuals involved in creating a sound record-
ing.21 5 It is common for most recording contracts to state that the
producer must be chosen by both the artist and the record com-
pany.216 In many recording contracts, the right to approve the pro-
ducer is the most significant creative control that the record company
is granted. 217 Like many other provisions in recording contracts, this
207. HALLORAN, supra note 2, at 332.
208. PASSMAN, supra note 201, at 124. If the artist's contract requires only a technically satis-
factory recording, then the record company must accept anything the artist delivers as long as it
is made without any technical deficiencies, such as hissing or skips. Id. While newer artists will
most likely have to accept a "commercially satisfactory" clause in their contracts, more estab-
lished artists can generally negotiate for the "technically satisfactory" clause. Id. Superstars can
negotiate for a clause that is even more favorable with the contract stating that "the recordings
must only be of a 'style' . . . similar to [their] previous recordings." Id.
209. Id.
210. HALLORAN, supra note 2, at 332; Raforth, supra note 200, at 1033.
211. KRASILOVSKY, supra note 3, at 19.
212. HALLORAN, supra note 2, at 332.
213. Id.
214. HALLORAN, supra note 2, at 332.
215. Producers are often instrumental in the artistic creation of the recording. The producer
is responsible for overseeing the creative process of the recording, which means "selecting songs,
deciding on arrangements," and choosing the right sound for the album. PASSMAN, supra note
201, at 133. Producers also have to "take care of all the administration, such as booking studios,"
hiring and paying musicians, and maintaining the recording budget. Id.
216. HALLORAN, supra note 2, at 342.
217. Id.
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provision can be negotiated by the artist if the artist has enough bar-
gaining power. 218
If the record company is granted a right of approval over portions
of the creative process, that does not necessarily make the artist an
employee. 219 Although the record company may retain a right of con-
trol over the finished products, courts tend to look more at control
over the details of the product's creation than control over the fin-
ished product.220 The level of control that a record company has over
recordings would be determined on a contract-by-contract basis, de-
pending mostly on the prior success of the artist. Therefore, it is diffi-
cult to state whether this first Reid factor weighs heavily in favor of
either the record industry or the artists. If the right to control factor
favors the record companies' position, the inquiry still would not be
finished.
b. The Skill Required for the Work
In Reid, the Court stated that control was not the sole determining
factor in the employer-employee analysis and that all of the factors
should be weighed together. 221 Using the Second Circuit's analysis
from Aymes, the next factor that must be examined is the skill re-
quired for the work.222 In general, recording artists have a high level
of musical skill, which indicates an independent contractor relation-
ship between the artist and the record company. 223 Musicians are part
of a highly skilled profession in which individual artists are signed to
recording contracts based on the record companies' perception of
their talent and potential profitability.2 24 Musicians utilize skills that
result from years of training and practice, which were developed
218. HALLORAN, supra note 2, at 388. An artist's attorney should try to create a contract
provision that gives the artist the exclusive right to select the producer; however, only an estab-
lished artist will be successful in obtaining that right. id.
219. See Lulirama Ltd., Inc. v. Axcess Broad. Serv., Inc., 128 F.3d 872, 877 (5th Cir. 1997)
(holding that the hired party was an independent contractor even though the hiring party had a
right to approve the jingles); see also Raforth, supra note 200, at 1034.
220. In High-Tech Video Prods., Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 58 F.3d 1093, 1097 (6th Cir.
1995), the court found that a video producer's control over details of a video project indicated an
employer-employee relationship between the producer and the artists making the video. Id.
However, the weight given to that factor was diminished due to the producer's reliance on the
artistic decisions made by the artists. Id. See also Forward v. Thorogood, 985 F.2d 604 (lst Cir.
1993) (paying for masters and possessing the tapes does not establish work-for-hire relationship);
see also Raforth, supra note 200, at 1033.
221. Community for Creative Non-Violence et al. v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 751 (1989).
222. Aymes v. Bonelli, 980 F.2d 857, 861 (2d Cir. 1992).
223. Reid, 490 U.S. at 751. In Reid, the Court found that Reid's high level of skill as a sculptor
indicated that he was hired by CCNV as an independent contractor Id.
224. See HALLORAN, supra note 2, at 319.
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before the signing of the record agreement. 225 For example, singer
Sheryl Crow received a bachelor's degree in piano performance from
the University of Missouri before she became a successful recording
artist.226 Similarly, the Court in Reid found the fact that Reid was a
sculptor, which it considered a skilled occupation, was evidence that
Reid was hired as an independent contractor.227 The standard set out
in Aymes was that a court should examine the "skill necessary to per-
form the work. ' 228 It is undeniable that it requires a high level of skill
to be a successful professional musician; therefore, this factor would
weigh against a finding that recording artists are employees of the re-
cord companies.
c. Payment Structure and Payment of Benefits
The next Reid factor to be considered when using the Aymes formu-
lation would be the payment structure and the payment of benefits. 229
The royalty payment arrangement used in most recording contracts
generally indicates an independent contractor relationship. 230 Record
companies do not pay artists wages or fixed salaries based on the
number of hours that they work, but they do pay other employees in
that way. 231 When an artist signs a recording contract, she is generally
given a fund that is used as a budget for recording her album. 232 Most
artist agreements contain a royalty payment arrangement in which the
225. See Hilton Int'l v. NLRB, 690 F.2d 318, 322 (2d Cir. 1982) (stating that band musicians
are members of a "highly skilled members of a clearly distinctive occupation").
226. Hearings, supra note 91, at 164 (statement of Sheryl Crow).
227. 490 U.S. at 752.
228. Aymes v. Bonelli, 980 F.2d 857, 862 (2d Cir. 1992). See Marco v. Accent Publ'g Co., 969
F.2d 1547 (3d Cir. 1992). The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit rejected the
argument that the position of a staff photographer did not require "more than a minimal knowl-
edge of photography." Id. at 1551. The court went on to say that although technology lowered
the amount of expertise once needed to be successful in the photography profession, "something
beyond owning a camera is necessary to make photographs suitable for a trade journal." Id.: see
generally Raforth, supra note 200, at 1038-39.
229. Aymes, 980 F.2d at 862.
230. Frisch, supra note 160, at 219.
231. Id. at 218-219.
232. PASSMAN, supra note 201, at 110. A recording fund encompasses recording costs in addi-
tion to any amount that the artist might receive as an advance. Id. The amount that an artist
might receive for a recording fund varies greatly with the stature of the artist. Id. at 111. A new
artist could receive anywhere from $5,000 to $300,000 depending on the type of label with whom
she signs. Id. A midrange artist can generally receive $300,000-$600,000 as an advance. Id.
Meanwhile, a superstar can successfully demand an advance over $1.5 million. Id. For example,
when R.E.M. signed a record deal with Warner Brothers in 1996, they were reportedly guaran-
teed a $10 million advance per album. Top of the Chart, R.E.M. Signs Record Contract, ST.
Louis PosT, Aug. 26, 1996, at 1.
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artist will receive a certain percentage of each album sold.233 Before
the artist receives royalty payments, money that the record company
has provided the artist is considered an advance and is recouped by
the record company. 234
233. PASSMAN, supra note 201, at 108. Royalty percentages generally range from nine to thir-
teen percent for a new artist. Id. An artist, who has been successful in the past, can expect to
receive royalties between fifteen and twenty percent. Id. These percentages are based on the
suggested retail list price of the album absent the taxes. KRASILOVSKY, supra note 3, at 19.
While a twelve percent royalty might sound reasonable, the amount of money the artist actu-
ally receives from that twelve percent is significantly lower due to a number of deductions taken
by the record company. Id. First, the producer's royalties for an album, which are approxi-
mately three percent, are deducted from the artist's percentage. KRASILOVSKY, supra note 3, at
21. Second, a deduction for the cost of packaging reduces the artist's base royalty by twenty-five
percent. Id. at 20. The rationale for this is that the artist should receive a royalty based on the
music alone, not on the artwork or designs added by the record company. Id. Third, artists'
royalties are reduced by another fifteen percent to compensate the record companies for records
given away to distributors for promotional purposes. Id. at 21. Fourth, record companies with-
hold a percentage of the artist's royalties, around thirty-five percent, as a reserve when stores
return unsold albums to the distributor. Id. Finally, record companies reduce the artist's royalty
rate for compact discs by fifteen to twenty percent, in order "to be reimbursed for their research
and development costs as well as for higher costs of manufacture." Id.
For exampled, a typical royalty calculation on a compact disc with a retail price of $14.98,
where the artist's base royalty is twelve percent would look something like this:
"12 percent - 3 percent (producer's royalty) = 9 percent
9 percent x .75 (25 percent reduction for packaging) = 6.75 percent
6.75 percent x .85 (15 percent for "free goods") = 5.74 percent
5.74 percent x .80 (20 percent reduction for compact discs) = 4.59 percent
4.59 percent x .65 (35 percent reduction for reserves) = 2.98 percent
2.98 percent of $14.98 = $0.447."
KRASILVOSKY, supra note 3, at 21-22.
Therefore, the artist actually receives significantly less than the twelve percent royalty pay-
ment provision in the contract.
Some contracts provide that the royalty rate for the album will increase once it has sold a
certain number of copies. PASSMAN, supra note 201, at 109. Generally, an artist's royalty per-
centage will increase approximately one percent once her record sales reach between 500,000
and 1,000,000 copies. Id. The royalty rates also depend on the type of sale that has occurred;
some sales, such as those through mail order distributors get an even smaller royalty percentage.
See HALLORAN, supra note 2, at 342-344.
234. KRASILOVSKY, supra note 3, at 23. Recording costs can vary depending on a variety of
factors, such as the size of the project, the price of the producer, and "the complexity of the
recordings." Id. In addition to recouping recording costs from the artist, most record companies
now also charge the artist for at least half of the promotional costs. See Tonya Pendleton, For
Hip-Hop and R&B Artists, the Price of Fame can be Bankruptcy, PHILADELPHIA DAILY NEWS,
Apr. 1, 1998, at I. These promotional costs encompass costs for travel, makeup, wardrobe, pro-
motional parties, merchandise, and videos. Id. For example, the cost of a video could run as
high as $250,000. Id. Another problem for artists is that the record company will recover its
expenditures for all of the artist's recordings before the artist receives any royalties. KRASILOV-
SKY, supra note 3, at 23. Therefore, if an artist finally has a successful album in her third attempt
and the recording costs for that album are recouped by the company, she still will not receive
any royalty payments until the recording costs for her first two albums have been recouped. Id.
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In this situation, the record company is analogous to a mortgage
bank that provides a person with a loan to purchase a new home.
235
Just as a homeowner must continuously reimburse a mortgage bank
for its loan until it is completely repaid, the artist must allow the re-
cord company to deduct the advance from royalty payments until it
has recouped the entire advance.236 The major difference between
these two arrangements is that, unlike a homeowner who takes owner-
ship of his house after the mortgage is completely paid off, the record-
ing artist pays off the advance while the record company continues to
own the rights to the recording.237
It is common for a new artist to receive a large advance at the be-
ginning of the contract that she cannot pay off with the royalties of the
song.238 The artist, therefore, is not guaranteed to ever profit from the
recording because the royalties are based on the commercial success
of the album.239 This type of royalty payment arrangement differs
greatly from a typical employment relationship where the employee
would be paid either in hourly wages or by salary. Thus, the royalty
payment structure strongly suggests that artists are independent con-
tractors of record companies, not employees. 240
In some cases, a record company pays an artist annual compensa-
tion. For example, in California, a record company is required to pay
the artist a guaranteed nine thousand dollar annual salary, which en-
ables the company to get an injunction against the artist in the case of
a breach of contract.24' This requirement applies to all members of a
group; therefore, record companies must choose whether the option
235. American Federation of Television and Radio Artists Position on "Works Made for Hire"
and Section 101 of the Copyright Act, at http://www.recordingartistscoalition.com/aftra.html (last
visited Feb. 28, 2001).
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. HALLORAN, supra note 2, at 338.
239. David Segal, Aspiring Rock Stars Find Major-Label Deals- - and Debts, WASHINGTON
PosT, May 13, 1995, at Al. Generally, a band would have to sell at least 400,000 albums to ever
see any royalties. Id. However, that type of success is extremely rare considering less than
fifteen percent of the sound recordings released by major record companies recoup their costs.
Hearings, supra note 91, at 125 (statement of Hilary Rosen, President of RIAA). Out of the
37,857 albums released in 1998, only 233 sold over 250,000 units and only 437 sold over 100,000
units. Id.
240. Frisch, supra note 160, at 219.
241. LAWRENCE J. BLAKE, THE MUSICIAN'S BUSINESS & LEGAL GUIDE, 367 (2d ed. 1996).
California Civil Code § 3423 used to require that an artist receive a six thousand dollar guaran-
teed minimum payment per year if the company wanted to receive an injunction against the
artist for breach of contract. Id. In 1993, the statute was amended to require a minimum pay-
ment of $50,000 per year. Id. When the record companies discovered this amendment, they
lobbied for a revision to the law. Id. Eventually in 1994, the amount was amended back down to
$9000 per year. Id.
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of injunctive relief is worth the cost of paying the artists an annual
salary.242 In some cases, the record company could choose only to pay
this annual compensation to the key members of the group. 243 If the
company were to pay an annual compensation to only select members
of a group, it would be extremely difficult to determine whether the
group as a whole is an employee of the company. As a result, situa-
tions may arise where certain members of a group would be consid-
ered employees, and others independent contractors. If the company
does make these annual payments, the relationship between the com-
pany and the artist resembles more of an employer-employee relation-
ship, rather than parties involved in a typical royalty based recording
agreement.
In addition, the fact that record companies generally do not pay
employment benefits for their artists indicates an independent con-
tractor arrangement. 244 In Aymes, the Second Circuit found that the
company's failure to pay the computer programmer employment ben-
efits to be a primary factor in finding an independent contractor ar-
rangement between the two parties.245 Similarly, recording artists
typically do not receive health insurance or any other benefits from
their record company, even though other record company employees
receive these benefits.246 This fact clearly indicates that recording art-
ists are independent contractors for the record companies.
d. Tax Treatment of the Hired Party
The fourth essential Reid factor to be considered under Aymes is
the tax treatment of the hired party. 247 Many times, a strong indica-
tion of a worker's employment status can be obtained by examining
how the employer treats the worker for tax purposes. 248 Record com-
242. The need for injunctive relief usually comes into play when the artist decides to record
for another label, Id.
243. HALLORAN, supra note 2, at 367. The record company would not be without relief if they
decided not to pay these annual payments because they could still to recover damages from the
group. Id.
244. Community for Creative Non-Violence et al. v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 752 (1989); see gener-
ally Raforth, supra note 200, at 1037.
245. Aymes v. Bonelli, 980 F.2d 857, 862 (2d Cir. 1992).
246. Frisch, supra note 160, at 219.
247. Aymes, 980 F.2d at 861.
248. Hi-Tech Video Productions, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 58 F.3d 1093, 1097 (6th Cir.
1995) (holding that the defendant's copyright of plaintiff's video as work made for hire was not
valid). See also Natkin v. Winfrey, IIl F. Supp. 2d t003, 1009-10 (N.D. I1. 2000) (holding that
photographers for Oprah Winfrey show were not employees of the production company because
the company's IRS reports described its payments to the photographers as non-employee
compensation).
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panics do not withhold federal or state income taxes for artists.
249
Artists also do not have any social security taxes taken out of their
royalty payments.250 In addition, artists do not receive any unemploy-
ment benefits.25' Although, record companies make their required
contributions to the musician's unions;252 the fact that record compa-
nies typically do not pay taxes for their artists demonstrates that the
companies and artists have an independent contractor relationship.
253
e. Right to Assign Additional Projects to Hired Party
The final Reid factor under Aymes is the right of the hiring party to
assign additional projects to the hired party.254 A typical recording
agreement contains a minimum recording commitment, as well as a
number of option periods.255 Generally, an artist is required to record
one album within the initial period of the agreement. 256 The record
company then retains the exclusive right to exercise an option to keep
the artist for another recording.257 The typical contract for a new art-
ist permits a "one-sided renewal" by the record companies for seven
additional albums.258 Generally, these options do not cover specific
periods of time, but they run until the artist completes the requested
album.2 59 In addition, most recording contracts contain exclusivity
provisions so the artist can record only for that company.2 60 This
means that only the contracting company has the right to request re-
cordings from the artist throughout the term of the contract. 261 There
249. Frisch, supra note 160, at 219.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. HALLORAN, supra note 2, at 350. Generally, record companies are required to make
payments to the union's health and retirement funds. Id. These payments generally amount to
approximately one percent of the retail price of the album. Id; see also Frisch, supra note 160, at
219.
253. The Second Circuit in Aymes found the tax treatment of the hired party to be one of the
most important factors in the test. 980 F.2d at 862-63. The failure to pay taxes for the hired
party demonstrates that the record company considers the artist to be an independent contrac-
tor. Id.
254. Id. at 861.
255. HALLORAN, supra note 2, at 329. "All major label ... recording contracts ... must be
approved by the American Federation of Musicians," which generally favors agreements that do
not last for more than five years. KRASILOVSKY, supra note 3, at 15.
256. HALLORAN, supra note 2, at 329.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. MCA Records, Inc. v. Newton-John, 90 Cal. App. 3d 18 (1979). Record companies in
California were forced to change contract terms so they would expire based at the completion of
a recording rather than the end of a specific period of time. Id. See also HALLORAN, supra note
2, at 350.
260. Id. at 333.
261. Id.
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are various exceptions to these exclusivity provisions, including excep-
tions that allow the artist to appear as a backup musician for other
artists.2 62 Nonetheless, this factor does not weigh significantly in favor
of either party, because while the record company is the sole party
that can exercise the options on a recording contract, it generally can-
not add recording requirements to the provisions of the contract. 263
f. The Effect of the Remaining Reid Factors
Several of the other Reid factors weigh in favor of finding an inde-
pendent contractor relationship between the record companies and
recording artists. The unstructured format of a recording artist's rela-
tionship with the record company indicates that the recording artist is
not an employee of the company. Another Reid factor is the extent of
the hiring party's discretion over when and how long to work. 264 This
factor favors the artists because they generally set their own work
schedules and only face deadlines for completion of the project.265 In
addition, most artists choose their own backup musicians and produc-
tion staff.266
The location of the work factor favors the artist because she gener-
ally has the ability to choose the location of the recording studio.267 In
addition, recording artists are usually responsible for providing their
own song material, as well as instruments for the recording sessions. 268
The fact that the recordings are part of the regular business of the
record companies may weigh in favor of the record companies. 269
This is different from the situation in Reid because CCNV did not
regularly commission sculptures as part of their business. 270 Although
this factor favors the record company, it does not outweigh the other
factors that favor the artist. Thus, a typical recording contract does
not create an employer-employee relationship between the artist and
the record company. "If inevitable, routine participation sufficed to
transform the hiring party into a work-for-hire author, Reid would be
262. id. at 334-35. These "sideman" exceptions allow the artist to appear with other artists on
their albums, as long as it is in a backup role. Id.
263. Frisch, supra note 160, at 219.
264. Community for Creative Non-Violence et al. v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 751-53 (1989).
265. Frisch, supra note 160, at 219. Similarly, in Reid, the artist chose his own work hours.
490 U.S. at 753. In addition, the Court found an independent contractor relationship even
though Reid faced a deadline, which he missed by twelve days, for the creation of the sculpture.
Id.
266. HALLORAN, supra note 2, at 340.
267. Id.
268. Frisch, supra note 160, at 220.
269. KRASILOVSKY, supra note 3, at 203; see also Raforth, supra note 200, at 1038-39.
270. Reid, 490 U.S. at 753.
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eviscerated and the law would retrogress to the 'actual supervision
and control rule' . ... 271 Therefore, based on a balancing test of the
factors set out in Reid, a recording artist would not be considered an
employee of the record company.
2. Sound Recordings as Commissioned Works
It is at best questionable whether the employment relationship cre-
ated by a record agreement would have qualified sound recordings as
works made for hire; therefore, the only way that the 1999 amend-
ment could have been considered a technical amendment was if sound
recordings clearly fit under the second prong of the work-for-hire def-
inition.272 For sound recordings to have fit this definition, they must
have qualified as one of the enumerated types of commissioned works
that are eligible for work-for-hire status.273 The RIAA's main argu-
ment in response to artists' criticism of the amendment was that sound
recordings did in fact fit within the categories of commissioned works
eligible for work-for-hire status, even before the 1999 amendment. 274
This argument centered around only a few of the listed categories.
Some categories, such as a translation, an instructional text, a test,
answer material for a test, or an atlas, can be eliminated immediately.
This leaves the categories of audiovisual works, contributions to col-
lective works, compilations, and supplemental works as the remaining
possibilities. 275 An examination of these remaining categories clearly
demonstrates that sound recordings had not obtained work-for-hire
status as commissioned works before the 1999 amendment.
a. Audiovisual Works
Sound recordings cannot fit under the "audiovisual works" provi-
sion in the works-for-hire definition. Under the 1976 Copyright Act
(Act), audiovisual works are defined as:
works that consist of a series of related images which are intrinsi-
cally intended to be shown by the use of machines or devices such as
projectors, viewers, or electronic equipment, together with accom-
271. SHL Imaging, Inc. v. Artisan House, Inc., 117 F. Supp. 2d 301, 314 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (find-
ing that a photographer for a catalog was not an employee of the company).
272. For a list of the defined categories, see supra note 35.
273. See Easter Seal Soc'y for Crippled Children & Adults v. Playboy Enters., 815 F.2d 323,
328 (5th Cir. 1987).
274. Hilary Rosen, The Letter that Billboard Refused to Print, at http://www.riaa.com/News_
Story.cfm?id=274 (Jan. 12, 2000). In her letter to Billboard, Hilary Rosen, the CEO of RIAA,
argued that sound recordings already had work-for-hire status because they have always been
considered either compilations or contributions to collective works. Id.
275. Raforth, supra note 200, at 1041.
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panying sounds, if any, regardless of the nature of the material ob-
jects, such as films or tapes, in which the works are embodied.2 76
From this definition, it seems that the focus of audiovisual works is on
the images that are shown, with the sounds only being an accompani-
ment to those images. 277 Nevertheless, it has been argued that purely
audio works can fit within that definition even if they do not contain
any images.278 In Lulirama Ltd. Inc. v. Axcess Broadcasting Ser-
vices,279 the United States Court of Appeals of the Fifth Circuit held
that the category "audiovisual works" did not encompass works that
merely contain audio components because the Act's definition of
sound recordings280 encompasses any purely audio work.2 81 If the
Fifth Circuit had decided that sound recordings qualified as audiovi-
sual works, Congress' decision to list audiovisual works and sound re-
cordings separately in the definition section of the 1976 Act would
have been redundant.28 2 Following the reasoning in this decision, it is
evident that sound recordings were not works made for hire as com-
missioned audiovisual works before the 1999 amendment.
However, the recent popularity of multimedia compact discs may
qualify some sound recordings as audiovisual works and, therefore,
works made for hire. Many artists have recently begun to release
their recordings on compact discs that, when played from a computer,
are accompanied by images. 28 3 If the contracts for these works con-
tain clauses that the recordings were being used as part of an audiovi-
sual work, then these recordings would qualify for work-for-hire
status, as long as the contract also contained a work-for-hire
provision.
b. Supplemental Works
Another commissioned works category that sound recordings could
arguably fall under is the supplemental works category. However, the
only way a sound recording could qualify as a supplementary work is
276. 17 U.S.C. §101 (1994).
277. Lulirama Ltd. Inc. v. Axcess Broad. Servs., 128 F.3d 872, 877-78 (5th Cir. 1997).
278. Lulirama, 128 F.3d at 877 (holding jingles written by independent contractor for advertis-
ing agency did not qualify for works made for hire under the specially ordered or commissioned
works prong of the definition).
279. 128 F.3d 872, 877 (5th Cir. 1997).
280. For a definition of sound recordings, see supra note 133.
281. Luliramna, 128 F.3d at 878; Raforth, supra note 2010, at 1041-42.
282. Lulirama, 128 F.3d at 878.
283. For example, Sarah McLachlan's "Surfacing" and Jewel's "Joy: A Holiday Collection"
are both "enhanced" or "hyper" compact discs that produce images when played through a
computer. SARAH McLACHLAN, SURFACING (Arista Records 1997); JEWEL, Joy: A HOLIDAY
CO)LLECIrION (Atlantic Records 1999).
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if the recording was created as a "secondary adjunct" to a prior
work.284 Most sound recordings do not fit within the statutory
description of supplemental works. A majority of sound recordings
are comprised of original material and not based on a pre-existing
work.285 In addition, it is difficult for an artist to sample 286 another
artist's preexisting recording because of the high cost of licensing.
28 7
While this category may allow written musical arrangements to qualify
for work-for-hire status, it does not apply to sound recordings. 288
Even if the artist's work was based on a preexisting underlying work,
the recording would have to fulfill one of the statutory purposes of a
supplemental work.289 Because it is unlikely that most sound record-
ings are created to fulfill one of these statutory purposes, the argu-
ment that sound recordings qualify as works made for hire as
supplemental works would fail.
c. Compilations
The third possible commissioned works category that could encom-
pass sound recordings is the compilation category; however, most
sound recordings do not qualify for works-for-hire status as compila-
tions.2 90 The Act defines a compilation as "a work formed by the col-
lection and assembling of preexisting materials that are selected,
coordinated or arranged in such a way that the resulting work as a
284. A supplemental work, for purposes of the works-for-hire definition, is a work "prepared
for publication as a secondary adjunct to a work by another author for the purpose of introduc-
ing, concluding, illustrating, explaining, revising, commenting upon, or assisting in the use of the
other work." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994). This statute gives the examples of maps, charts, forewords,
editorial notes, musical arrangements, bibliographies, and indexes as works that would be con-
sidered supplemental works. Id; see also Raforth, supra note 200, at 1044.
285. HALLORAN, supra note 2, at 331. Record contracts typically contain a provision that
requires an artist to produce original works of music for the album. Id.
286. "The term digital sampling, or sampling refers to the recording of a sound, or a portion of
a previously existing sound recording, with the aid of a device that can store the recording in
binary form in the memory of a computer." AL KOHN & BOB KOHN, KOHN ON Music LICENS-
ING 1287 (2d ed. 1996).
287. Id. at 1417. An artist must sign a warranty in a record contract that none of the material
on his album violates or infringes upon any rights of a third party. BLAKE, supra note 242. at
360. In order to use another artist's material without infringing his rights, the artist using the
material must obtain a license to use the preexisting work. KOHN, supra note 286. at 1299.
These licenses range in price, depending on the popularity and bargaining power of the original
song and artist, because there is no set fee for a sampling license. Id. at 1300. A typical sampling
license could cost from $1,500-$5,000 for a buy out or it could cost the artist a half-cent to three
cents of royalties. Id. at 1417.
288. KRASILOVSKY, supra note 3, at 204.
289. For a list of the statutory purposes of a supplemental work, see supra note 284. See also
Raforth, supra note 200, at 1044 n.119.
290. Raforth, supra note 200, at 1043.
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whole constitutes an original work of authorship. '291 The key is that
most sound recordings do not consist of pre-existing material, but
rather of newly recorded material. 292 "A song is a fully integrated
work rather than an assembled collection of separately preexisting
materials; the parts of a song - such as voice and instrumental num-
ber - are assembled to form a 'unitary' whole. '293
If the song itself does not qualify as a compilation, then it must be
argued that the album as a whole is a compilation, with the songs
equaling the pre-existing work and the album being the arrangements
of those works.294 However, this argument fails for two reasons.
First, an album lacks the necessary creativity to be considered an
"original work of authorship. '295 Second, an album can be considered
a unified work, which has an underlying theme and design. 296 In order
for an album to be considered a compilation, there must be originality
in the selection and arrangement of the songs on the album.2 97 Under
the compilation provision, sound recordings would not have qualified
as works made for hire before the 1999 amendment because the ma-
jority of record albums created under record contracts do not meet
the originality requirements necessary to be a copyrightable
compilation.
However, it can be argued that there are some record albums that
would qualify as compilations. For example, live albums could qualify
as compilations, presuming that the album does not include an entire
performance but rather a selection of certain highlights of a live per-
291. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
292. Recording contracts generally have a provision that the material for an album must con-
sist of the artist's "newly recorded studio performances." HALLORAN, supra note 2, at 331.
293. Raforth, supra note 200, at 1043. See also Hearings, supra note 91, at 143 (statement of
Professor Paul Goldstein) (stating that the argument that the recording of an individual song
constitutes a compilation is weak because most, if not all, copyrightable works can be dissected
in a similar way).
294. Raforth, supra note 200, at 1042.
295. Feist Publications, Inc., v. Rural Tel. Serv., 499 U.S. 340 (1991). The Supreme Court set
out the originality requirements that a compilation must meet to satisfy the "minimal amount of
creativity" standard. Id. The Court required that there be a "discretionary selection and assem-
bly of works" from among a larger collection of pre-existing works. Id. Most record albums
would not meet this standard because they usually contain all of an artist's newly recorded mate-
rial, so no selection is necessary. Raforth, supra note 200, at 1043.
296. Sheryl Crow stated that a sound recording is "the final result of the creative vision, ex-
pression, and execution of one person- the featured artist." Hearings, supra note 91, at 166.
(statement of Sheryl Crow). She compared her albums to movies, a story with a beginning, a
middle, and an ending. Id. at 165. When creating an album, she tries to "create a feel that will
take the listener on a journey." Id. This is a perfect description of an album as a unitary whole,
and as such, it cannot be considered a compilation. See also Raforth, supra note 200, at 1043.
297. KRASILOVSKY, supra note 3, at 204.
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formance or multiple performances. 298 Live albums are not very prev-
alent in the recording industry as they do not generally fulfill the
requirements of a recording contract.299 Although live albums may
qualify as compilations, this exception does not warrant the claim that
all sound recordings were works made for hire before the 1999
amendment.
d. Collective Works
The final commissioned works category that may include sound re-
cordings is the contributions to collective works section. 300 The Act
defines a collective work as "a work, such as a periodical issue, anthol-
ogy, or encyclopedia, in which a number of contributions, constituting
separate and independent works in themselves, are assembled into a
collective whole. '' 30 ' A collective work is basically a compilation that
includes independently copyrightable works.30 2 In order for a sound
recording to be considered a contribution to a collective work, the
album for which it was created must then be a collective work. 30 3 For
example, a Christmas album that contains recordings by different art-
ists could be considered a collective work.30 4 However, it is unlikely
that a record album would be considered a collective work for the
same reasons that it would not qualify as a compilation. 30 5 As stated
above, most artists produce masters only for songs that are going to be
included on the album; the record company does not need to use any
298. Feist, 499 U.S. at 340. An album that merely contains a recording of an entire live per-
formance would not meet the minimal creativity standard set out in Feist. Id. However, some
artists release albums that contain recordings of performances from different concerts and the
selection of these different recordings may meet the minimal creativity requirement.
299. See HALLORAN, supra note 2, at 332. If an artist has been successful enough to create a
demand for a live album, a record company will release a live album even though it generally
will not count toward that artist's contractual recording requirements. Id.
300. Raforth, supra note 200, at 1043; Frisch, supra note 160, at 222.
301. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
302. Raforth, supra note 200, at 1043.
303. Id.
304. Hearings, supra note 91, at 152 (statement of Professor Marci Hamilton). Additionally,
Professor Jaszi has stated, "It would strain ordinary principles of statutory construction (to say
nothing of common sense) to extend this rubric to the individual musical selections making up an
album of songs created as an artistic unit by a single recording artist." Peter Jaszi, Letter of Law
Professors Opposing Addition of Sound Recordings to Commissioned Works Made for Hire Pro-
visions, at http://www.recordingartistscoalition.com/letter.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2001).
305. Raforth, supra note 200, at 1043. Collective works require the same minimal amount of
creativity required for compilations. Id. The selection of materials for an album does not satisfy
that requirement. Id. But see Hearings, supra note 91, at 143 (statement of Professor Paul Gold-
stein) (claiming that the contribution of a recording "as one of several selections on a CD ... will
typically constitute a contribution to a collective work.").
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amount of creativity in selecting them for the album. 30 6 In addition,
the artists could argue that the recordings were not commissioned to
be a part of a collective work because the recordings can also be sold
individually as singles.3117 The record companies would counter that
argument by stating that the singles are only sold as promotional tools
for the album. 318
Courts, when confronted with the issue of whether an album is a
collective work, would need to decide on a case-by-case basis whether
the selection of songs for the album contained a minimal amount of
creativity. It is possible that an artist could produce more recordings
than necessary for the album, so the selection of songs chosen for the
album could contain the minimal amount of creativity necessary to be
a copyrightable work.30 9 If this is the case, and the record company
does meet the creativity requirement, then the album would be a col-
lective work.310 The record companies could also argue that albums
are separate and distinct from the recordings themselves and, there-
fore, are similar to encyclopedias and periodicals. 31' If courts were to
decide that some individual sound recordings were already works
made for hire before the 1999 amendment, it would most likely be
under the conclusion that the recordings qualified as collective
works.312 The mere fact that sound recordings do qualify as contribu-
tions to collective works does not imply that all sound recordings qual-
ified as works made for hire before the 1999 amendment. 313 This
determination would have to be decided on an individual basis, and
even if some recordings were collective works, there is no basis for the
306. Similarly, Congress noted that a set of three one-act plays would not satisfy the minimal
amount of creativity required for collective works. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476; see also Raforth,
supra note 200, at 1043. But see Apple Barrel Prods., Inc. v. Beard, 730 F.2d 384, 387-88 (5th Cir.
1984) (finding that a television program that combined songs and dances by various artists con-
stituted a collective work); Roy Export Establishment of Vaduz v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 672
F.2d 1095, 1102-03 (2d Cir. 1982) (holding that a film containing clips of Charlie Chaplin movies
constituted a collective work), as cited in, Hearings, supra note 91, at 143 (statement of Professor
Paul Goldstein).
307. KRASILOVSKY, supra note 3, at 204; Frisch, supra note 160, at 223.
308. KRASILOVSKY, supra note 3, at 204.
309. Peter Jaszi, Letter of Law Professors Opposing Addition of Sound Recordings to Com-
missioned Works Made for Hire Provisions, at http://www.recordingartistscoalition.com/letter.
html (last visited Feb. 28, 2001).
310. Frisch, supra note 160, at 222.
311. Id. at 223.
312. Id.
313. Peter Jaszi, Letter of Law Professors Opposing Addition of Sound Recordings to Com-
missioned Works Made for Hire Provisions, at http://www.recordingartistscoalition.com/letter.
html (last visited Feb. 28, 2001).
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record industry's claim that all sound recordings were works made for
hire prior to the amendment.
e. The Effect of Work-for-hire Provisions in Record Contracts
Although most record contracts contain provisions that label the
artist's recordings as works made for hire, those provisions do not, in
and of themselves, make the recordings works-for-hire. Frequently,
record companies will attempt to ensure that the artist's recordings
are the property of the company by including provisions in the con-
tract that the recordings are being created on a work-for-hire basis 3 14
The work-for-hire provisions in recording contracts do not alone qual-
ify the recordings for work-for-hire status unless the recordings fall
within one of the enumerated categories of commissioned works. 31 5 If
sound recordings qualified as one of the enumerated commissioned
works, 316 the only effect of these contractual work-for-hire provisions
is that they would satisfy the written agreement requirement for the
commissioned works prong of the work-for-hire definition. If a record
contract designates an artist's contribution as a work made for hire,
but the contribution is not a work made for hire as defined by the
statute, then that clause is merely "an ordinary assignment transfer-
ring the artist's share of the sound recording copyright" to the com-
pany.317  The 1999 amendment included sound recordings as a
separate category of specially ordered or commissioned works that
could qualify for work-for-hire status. If that provision had remained
in effect, the work-for-hire provisions in recording contracts would
314. HALORAN, supra note 2, at 335-6. A typical recording provision would read as follows:
All masters recorded by Artist during the Term from the inception of the recording
thereof and all reproductions derived therefrom, together with the performances em-
bodied thereon, shall be the property of Company for the Territory free from any
claims whatsoever by Artist or any person deriving any rights or interests from Artist.
Each such master shall be considered a work made for hire for Company; if any such
master is determined not to be a work made for hire it will be deemed transferred to
Company by this agreement, together with all rights in it.
Id.
The companies include the transfer provision because they are aware that it is not certain that
sound recordings can qualify for work-for-hire status. Id.
315. 1 NIMMER, supra note 27, § 5.03[B][2][b], at 5-40.
316. 17 U.S.C. § 101. In order for specially ordered or commissioned works to qualify as
works made for hire, there must be a written agreement signed by both parties designating them
as such. Id.; see also Playboy Enter. Inc. v. Dumas, 53 F.3d 549, 560 (2d Cir. 1995) (stating that a
legend that confirmed the works were works made for hire would satisfy the writing requirement
as long as it was signed by both parties).
317. Peter Jaszi, Letter of Law Professors Opposing Addition of Sound Recordings to Com-
missioned Works Made for Hire Provisions, at http://www.recordingartistscoalition.com/letter.
html (last visited Feb. 28, 2001).
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have successfully fulfilled the written agreement requirement needed
to qualify a sound recording as a work-for-hire.
f. The Legislative History of the 1976 Copyright Act
Although a few individual sound recordings may have qualified as
works made for hire as contributions to collective works before the
1999 amendment, most would have fallen outside of the definition. In
fact, before the 1999 amendment was passed, two district courts ruled
that sound recordings did not qualify for work-for-hire status because
they were not specifically listed in the commissioned works prong of
the work-for-hire definition.318 The legislative history of the commis-
sioned works prong of the works-for-hire definition also supports the
conclusion that sound recordings did not qualify as works made for
hire. In deciding the categories of commissioned works to include as
works-for-hire, Congress was concerned about the complications that
may arise in the creation of works by a significant number of people,
such as movies or encyclopedias. 319 The concern was the potential for
great unfairness to the commissioning parties of these works, if each
author had been able to retain his termination rights.320 The list of
commissioned works was then created as a compromise between au-
thors, motion picture companies, and the publishing industry. 321
While it is true that numerous people can potentially be involved in
the creation of a sound recording, these projects do not compare to
the large collaborative effort it takes to create a movie. 322 Therefore,
a party that commissions a sound recording would not require the
same amount of protection as a motion picture studio.323
In fact, the creation of a sound recording is analogous to the crea-
tion of a book, as opposed to a motion picture.32 4 Like a recording
artist, the author of a book forms a concept for the book before she
318. Ballas v. Tedesco, 41 F. Supp. 2d 531, 541 (D.N.J. 1999); Staggers v. Real Authentic
Sound, 77 F. Supp. 2d 57, 64 (D.D.C. 1999)(claiming, in dicta, that sound recordings are not
works-for-hire under the statute because they do not fit within any of the categories of specially
ordered or commissioned works).
319. Raforth, supra note 200, at 1048-49.
320. Id.
321. Community for Creative Non-Violence et al. v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 746 (1989). Even
though Congress was considering adding sound recordings as copyrightable material around the
same time the works made for hire provision was being created, sound recordings were never
mentioned as a potential category of commissioned works. Hearings, supra note 91, at 87 (state-
ment of Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights).
322. Raforth, supra note 200, at 1049.
323. Id.
324. American Federation of Television and Radio Artists Position on "Works Made for Hire"
and Section 101 of the Copyright Act, at http://www.recordingartistscoalition.com/aftra.html (last
visited Feb. 28, 2001).
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receives input from her publisher.325 A book publisher generally of-
fers an advance, provides an editor, designs artwork for the cover, and
publishes the book for the author.326 Similarly, the record company
offers an advance, provides a producer, designs the cover for the com-
pact disc, and distributes the recording. 327 Although, the functions of
a book publisher and record company are similar, it is rarely argued
that a book could be a commissioned work made for hire under the
Act. 328 In fact, five of the commissioned works categories are related
to book publishing; 329 yet, Congress did not want to impair the au-
thors' abilities to remain creators and owners of their works.330
Therefore, it is logical that sound recording artists, like authors of
books, should be able to remain authors of their works. The decision
of the legislature not to include sound recordings as commissioned
works, when the Act was first drafted, clearly indicates that sound re-
cordings did not qualify as works made for hire before the 1999 sound
recording amendment.
The portion of the Act's legislative history that describes the protec-
tion for sound recordings also supports the conclusion that sound re-
cordings are not works made for hire. 331 It stated that "the
copyrightable elements in a sound recording will usually, though not
always, involve 'authorship' both on the part of the performers whose
performance is captured and on the part of the record producer re-
sponsible for . . . capturing and electronically processing the
sounds. '332 However, the House Report goes on to state that, in some
instances, a producer might not contribute enough to a recording to
warrant a claim of authorship. 333 Even though it mentions the parties
who could claim to be the author of a sound recording, the House
Report never mentions the contributions of the record companies.
3. The 1999 Amendment as a "Technical Amendment"
Congress was excused from holding public hearings on the 1999
amendment only because it was classified as a technical amendment.
325. Id.
326. Id.
327. Id.
328. Id.
329. The five categories related to book publishing are: a translation, an instructional text, a
test, answer material for a test, and an atlas. 17 U.S.C. §101 (1994).
330. American Federation of Television and Radio Artists Position on "Works Made for Hire"
and Section 101 of the Copyright Act, at http://www.recordingartistscoalition.com/aftra.html (last
visited Feb. 28, 2001).
331. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476 at 56 (1976).
332. Id.
333. Id.
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It was unusual for Congress to label an amendment to a twenty-four
year-old statute as a "technical and clarifying change. ' 334 Technical
amendments are generally used to correct poor grammar, misspell-
ings, and other errors that are insignificant to the actual rights granted
in the statute. 335 There are clear examples of typical technical amend-
ments included in the Work Made for Hire and Copyright Corrections
Act of 2000.336 For example, section 3(a)(2) of the Work Made for
Hire and Copyright Corrections Act of 2000 changes the wording of
17 U.S.C. § 705 to: "The Register of Copyrights shall ensure that
records of deposits, registrations, recordations, and other actions
taken under this title are maintained, and that indexes of such records
are prepared. '337 Previously, section 705 had read: "The Register of
Copyrights shall provide and keep in the Copyright Office records of
all deposits, registrations, recordations, and other actions taken under
this title, and shall prepare indexes of all such records. '338 The reor-
dering of the Register of Copyrights' duties, listed in this provision,
does not have any effect on the substance of the provision itself.
There were many similar amendments included in the Works Made
for Hire and Copyright Corrections Act of 2000 that were classified as
noncontroversial corrections to the Copyright Act because they were
merely needed to "remove expired sections and clarify miscellaneous
provisions." 339
Other examples of true technical amendments were included in the
Act entitled Technical Corrections to Title 17, United States Code,
signed into law in August 1999.34o. Section 1(e) of this bill states: "Sec-
tion 1202(e)(2)(B) of Title 17, United States Code, is amended by
striking 'category or works' and inserting 'category of works."' 341
This amendment illustrates the exact purpose of a technical amend-
ment because the amendment merely corrects a typographical error in
the statute. Similarly, an amendment included in the same bill is used
to correct a misspelling of the word "acknowledgment" in section
1320(c) of the Act. 342
334. See Hull, supra note 143, at 1.
335. See 1 NIMMER, supra note 27, § 5.03[B][2][a][ii], at 5-38.1 n121.7. "Technical amend-
ments are generally used to make the Copyright Act read well." Id.
336. 146 CoNo. REc. H7244 (Sept. 6, 2000).
337. Id.
338. 17 U.S.C. § 705 (1994); 146 CoNe. REC. H7244 (Sept. 6, 2000).
339. 146 CONG. REc. H7244 (Sept. 6, 2000).
340. Technical Corrections to Title 17 United States Code, Pub. L. No. 106-44, 113 Stat. 221
(1999).
341. Id.
342. Id.
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The language of the 1999 amendment illustrates that Congress' de-
cision to classify the amendment as technical was, in fact, hasty.3 43
The amendment added the phrase "as a sound recording," after the
term "audiovisual work" within the work-for-hire definition. 344 As a
result, the statute then stated "as a part of a motion picture or other
audiovisual work [sic] as a sound recording,, [sic] as a translation
...." Ironically, it would have required a true technical amend-
ment to correct the punctuation errors caused by the 1999 amendment
if it had not been repealed.3 46
In contrast to the examples of true technical amendments discussed
above, the 1999 sound recording amendment changed the substantive
rights of copyright owners by automatically qualifying sound record-
ings as eligible for work-for-hire status. This type of change differs
dramatically from a spelling correction or a grammatical adjustment.
In order for the 1999 amendment to have qualified as a technical
amendment, it would have to have been clear that sound recordings
were eligible as works made for hire before the amendment was
passed. As demonstrated in the above analysis, that is simply not true.
By adding sound recordings to the list of works that can be labeled as
specially commissioned works, Congress effectively eliminated the
termination rights of artists.347 By no stretch of the imagination can
this be considered a technical change. On November 28, 1999, the day
before the amendment was passed, artists believed that they would
have the ability to reclaim their recordings at some point in the fu-
ture.348 The next day that ability was eliminated without so much as a
public hearing. At a minimum, the artists were entitled to inform
Congress of their concerns over losing their future termination rights.
Because the 1999 amendment had such a dramatic effect on the rights
of the artists, it could not be considered a technical amendment.
The record industry has argued that the 1999 amendment was
merely technical because it had always registered recordings as works-
343. See I NIMMER, supra note 27, § 5.03[B][2][a][ii], at 5-38.1 n121.7.
344. The Satellite Home Viewer Improvement Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113, § 1011(d).
113 Stat. 1501, (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994 & Supp. V 1999)), repealed by Work Made for
Hire and Copyright Corrections Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-379 (2000).
345. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994 & Supp. V 1999): 1 NIMMER, supra note 27, § 5.03[B][2][a][ii], at 5-
38.1 n121.7.
346. 1 NIMMER, supra note 27, § 5.03[B][2][a][ii l , at 5-38.1 n121.7.
347. See supra notes 127-132 and accompanying text.
348. One artist described the termination rights as "[the] light at the end of the tunnel" after
years of performing under a contract that heavily favored the record company. Hearings, supra
note 91, at 177 (statement of Michael Greene, president of NARAS).
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for-hire with the Copyright Office.349 However, the mere practice of
registering the recordings as works-for-hire does not actually make
them works-for-hire. 350 The Copyright Office does not investigate
whether a sound recording, registered as a work-for-hire, actually
meets the statutory requirements for that classification.351 "The fact
that the recent amendment ... corresponds to record industry practice
does not make it a technical amendment if that industry practice did
not correspond to the legal requirements for works made for hire. ' 352
Additionally, the 1999 Act did not apply the provision retroac-
tively.353 As a result, a sound recording produced in 2000 would have
qualified as a specially commissioned work, but any recording created
before the amendment would not have been a work-for-hire, even if
there was a signed written agreement labeling it as a work-for-hire. 354
Therefore, even the language contained within the Act made the
amendment a substantive change in the law. Thus, Congress should
not have passed the amendment without any legislative hearings on
the matter.
V. IMPACT
The passage of the 1999 sound recording amendment did have one
positive feature: it opened the door for communication between the
recording industry and recording artists on the entire matter. Now
that the issue has been brought to the forefront, there is reason to
hope that the two groups will be able to create a compromise before
artists begin to file termination notices in 2003. The Work Made for
Hire and Copyright Corrections Act of 2000 left artists and record
companies without a definitive solution on this matter. Both groups
would greatly benefit by creating a compromise before the issue is
decided by the courts.
349. Hearings, supra note 91, at 131 (statement of Hilary Rosen, president of RIAA). Ms.
Rosen asserted that many artists who own the rights to their own recordings, such as R.E.M. and
Dave Matthews, register themselves as authors of the works using the works made for hire doc-
trine. Id. at 131.
350. Hearings, supra note 91, at 90 (statement of Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights).
351. Id.
352. Id.
353. The Satellite Home Viewer Improvement Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113, § 1011(d),
113 Stat. 1501, (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994 & Supp. V 1999)), repealed by Work Made for
Hire and Copyright Corrections Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-379 (2000); see 1 NIMMER, supra
note 27, § 5.03[B][2][a][ii], 5-38.2 n. 121.11.
354. I NIMMER, supra note 27, § 5.03[B][2][a][ii], at 5-38.2.
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A. The Effects of the 2000 Amendment; Courts Will Consider the
Change in the Law
When the representatives for the recording industry and recording
artists were working on the compromise that resulted in the Work
Made for Hire and Copyright Corrections Act of 2000, their goal was
to create a neutral repeal of the 1999 sound recording amendment. 355
In order to achieve this goal, representatives of both parties and mem-
bers of Congress agreed to include a provision in the 2000 Act that
attempts to remove any possible effect of the 1999 amendment on fu-
ture litigation.356 This provision was necessary to avoid having courts
interpret the amendment's repeal as demonstrating Congress' support
for the artists' argument that sound recordings did not qualify as
works made for hire. However, it is not clear whether this provision
will be effective.
While introducing the Work Made for Hire and Copyright Correc-
tions Act of 2000, Representative Howard Berman stated that Con-
gress was aware of the potential danger that the repeal may be
interpreted as a statement by Congress that sound recordings are not
eligible for work-for-hire status.357 Representative Berman cited to
American Automobile Ass'n v. United States,358 a case in which the
Supreme Court interpreted a retroactive repeal of two sections in the
Internal Revenue Code, one year after they were enacted.35 9 The Tax
Code provisions that Congress enacted in 1954 were the first to specif-
ically permit use of an income accounting system that had been used
by industries in the past.360 One year later, Congress repealed the
provisions because the Treasury believed that the authorization of the
accounting system would have an adverse effect on the Government's
revenue. 361 In the legislative history of the repeal, Congress expressed
that it did not intend to "disturb prior law as it affected accrual ac-
counting provisions. ' 362 Nevertheless, the Court interpreted the re-
355. 146 CONG. REC. H7244, 7245 (Sept. 6, 2000).
356. See supra notes 180-181 and accompanying text.
357. 146 CONG. REC. H7244, 7245 (Sept. 6, 2000) (statement of Representative Howard
Berman).
358. 367 U.S. 687 (1961).
359. Id.
360. Id. In this case, the American Automobile Association used an accrual-based accounting
method when calculating its income. Id. at 688. The Association used this system for a number
of years, although it was not specifically authorized by the Tax Code. Id. at 694. Before these
provisions were added to the Code, it was left up to the discretion of the courts and Commis-
sioner to decide whether the accrual system had been used appropriately. Id.
361. 367 U.S. at 695. This repeal was done retroactively, in order to remove any impact of the
provisions. Id.
362. Id.; H.R. Rep. No. 293, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 4-5, (1954).
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peal as a "clear mandate" from Congress that the accounting system
"was not acceptable for tax purposes.1363
The Works Made for Hire and Copyright Corrections Act of 2000
creates an extemely similar situation to the one in American Automo-
bile Ass'n.364 Record companies claimed ownership to the copyrights
in sound recordings by labeling them as works made for hire many
years before the enactment of the 1999 amendment. 365 The 2000 Act
repealed the only law that specifically stated that sound recordings
were eligible for work-for-hire status. 366 It was entirely possible that
courts may have decided to follow the logic found in American Auto-
mobile Ass'n and find that the repeal of the 1999 amendment implied
that Congress believed that sound recordings can not qualify for
work-for-hire status. 367 This potential danger led Congress to include
Section 2(a)(2) in the 2000 Act, which instructs courts to disregard
both amendments when deciding whether a sound recording is a
work-for-hire. 368 In addition, the repeal was given a retroactive effect
to prevent any potential problems that the 1999 amendment could
have caused recording artists who created a sound recording between
November 29, 1999 and October 27, 2000.369 Because Congress care-
fully drafted this provision, recording artists and record companies
should be able to trust that courts will not give either amendment any
effect in future cases determining the work-for-hire status of sound
recordings. However, there is always a risk that courts could allow the
amendments to affect their decisions in spite of the language in the
363. American Automobile Ass'n, 367 U.S. at 695. The Court interpreted the repeal to mean
that the accounting method was not acceptable because Congress had "repealed the only law
incontestably permitting the practice." Id.
364. 146 CoNG. REc. H7244, 7245 (Sept. 6, 2000) (statement of Representative Howard
Berman).
365. Id.
366. Id.
367. Id. Representative Berman stated that "under a well-known canon of statutory construc-
tion, courts assume that Congress is aware of existing judicial decisions when it enacts legislation
and, unless Congress indicates otherwise and to the extent reasonable, courts interpret such
legislation to be consistent with those decisions." Id. Because two district courts mentioned that
sound recordings did not fit within one of the enumerated categories in the work-for-hire defini-
tion, future courts could have interpreted the 2000 amendment as being Congress' approval of
those decisions. Id. See also Ballas v. Tedesco, 41 F. Supp. 2d 531, 541 (D.N.J. 1999); Staggers v.
Real Authentic Sound, 77 F. Supp. 2d 57, 64 (D.D.C. 1999) (claiming, in dicta, that sound record-
ings are not works-for-hire under the statute because they do not fit within any of the categories
of specially ordered or commissioned works).
368. 146 CoNo. REc. H7244, 7245 (Sept. 6, 2000) (statement of Representative Howard
Berman). To view the text of the section, see supra note t85.
369. 146 CONG. REC. H7244, 7245 (Sept. 6, 2000) (statement of Representative Howard
Berman).
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2000 amendment.370 If courts use the amendment in this way, then
artists will be entitled to use their termination rights and regain the
rights to their sound recordings.
Recently, a district court judge in the Southern District of New
York had the first opportunity to interpret the effects of both the 1999
and 2000 Acts. In UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, 371 the defen-
dant argued that the plaintiff filed numerous fraudulent copyright cer-
tificates with the Copyright Office for its artists' sound recordings
because they listed the recordings as works made for hire.372 The Re-
cording Artists Coalition filed an amicus brief that asked the court to
refrain from holding that sound recordings are works made for hire
because they did not want the case to impact their continuing battle to
protect their right to reclaim their recordings. 373 However, the judge
never had an opportunity to rule on the work-for-hire issue because
the parties settled the claim at the beginning of the damages portion
of the trial. 374 By entering the judgment without ruling on the works-
for-hire issue, Judge Jed S. Rakoff preserved the recording artists'
claim that they are entitled to reclaim their recordings through the
termination provision of the Act.375 However, online infringement
suits, such as MP3.com, are becoming more frequent, 376 so this issue
370. Id. Representative Berman stated that there was a possibility that courts could deter-
mine that the retroactive application of the repeal is unconstitutional under the Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendments. Id. However, Congress inserted a "severability clause" into the provision
of the Act making it retroactive; therefore, the entire statute cannot be found unconstitutional.
Id.
371. 2000 WL 1262568 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2000).
372. Tamara Conniff, UMG, MP3 Battle Continues, HOLLYWOOD REP., Nov. 7, 2000, at 1.
MP3.com was found guilty of willful copyright infringement of recordings owned by UMG and
ordered to pay $25,000 in damages per recording infringed. UMG, 2000 WL 1262568 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 6, 2000). In response, Mp3.com argued that they should not be forced to pay any damages,
claiming that UMG did not actually own any of the recordings because the record company had
falsely listed themselves as authors on their Copyright registrations based on the work-for-hire
theory. Conniff, supra note 372, at 1 (citing UMG, 2000 WL 1262568 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2000)).
373. See Conniff, supra note 372, at 1; see also RAC View on UMG/MP3.Com Case, BILL-
BOARi), Nov. 25, 2000, at 3.
374. See RAC View on UMG/MP3. Corn Case, supra note 373, at 3. The final judgment against
MP3.Com totaled $53 million. Id.
375. Id.
376. The other high-profile online infringement case that is currently pending is A&M
Records v. Napster, Inc., 2001 WL 115033 (9th Cir. Feb. 12, 2001). In this case, the Recording
Industry Association of America brought suit on behalf of all of the major recording labels
against Napster alleging that Napster has committed contributory copyright infringement by al-
lowing Internet users to download other Internet users' copies of copyrighted recordings. Id.
Recently, the Court of Appeals of the Ninth Circuit found that the record companies have a high
likelihood of succeeding on the infringement claim and ordered the district court to reconstruct
an injunction that would prevent Napster from operating until the outcome of the case has been
determined. ld.
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will not disappear anytime soon. Courts are eventually going to have
to decide whether the record companies do, in fact, own the right to
their artists' recordings.
B. The Need for a Permanent Solution
Due to the rising number of online infringement cases involving the
recording industry and the fast approaching effective date for termina-
tion notices in 2003, it is imperative that the record companies and
recording artists reach a definitive solution to the work-for-hire issue.
It would not be beneficial for either group to wait for courts to rule on
the issue because courts in various jurisdictions could answer the
question differently, which would cause great turmoil throughout the
record industry. Such inconsistency would lead to a situation where
some recordings are considered works made for hire in one jurisdic-
tion, but recordings created in the exact same way are not considered
works made for hire in another jurisdiction. This would severely ham-
per the industry's ability to create record contracts and continue
business.
One solution suggested by the Copyright Office would be to create
a statutory provision that qualifies sound recordings as works made
for hire, except when applied to the main contributors on the record-
ing.377 This solution would benefit both recording artists and the mu-
sic companies. Under this solution, the backup musicians and the
producers who help record the album would be subject to the work-
for-hire clause, so they would be unable to enforce any termination
rights thirty-five years later.378 The artist, however, whether it is a
person or a group, would not be subject to the work-for-hire clause, so
their contracts with the record companies could be terminated after
thirty-five years.3 79
This solution would protect the main artists' termination rights,
while simultaneously protecting the interests of both the artists and
record companies, by preventing background artists from terminating
their licenses and hampering the distribution of the work. Congress
created the termination provisions in the Act to protect authors that
transfer the rights to their works before they have the ability to appre-
377. Hearings, supra note 91, at 93 (statement of Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights).
378. For a discussion of the potential impact the termination rights could have on the music
industry, see generally Frisch, supra note 160.
379. Id. Marybeth Peters suggested that the exemption should apply to artists who "have
royalty contracts with respect to the distribution of the sound recording." Id. However, she also
mentioned that may not be an adequate definition because many backup musicians also receive
royalties for performing on recordings. Id.
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ciate the work's value.380 Recording artists have an equal right to
benefit from the termination rights provision as other artists. The re-
cord companies typically hold all of the bargaining power when nego-
tiating record contracts, especially with new artists. These record
companies should not be allowed to reap all of the benefits of an art-
ist's work forever.
The record companies have argued that allowing artists to terminate
their record contracts would remove any incentive from the record
companies to sign an unknown artist. They assert that the record in-
dustry is a risky business because few sound recordings actually
recoup their costs. 381 In order to stay in business, companies have to
structure contracts in a way that will maximize their profit from the
few successful artists.382 In that situation, the successful artists end up
subsidizing the labels' ability to take risks on unknown groups.383
However, this argument does not create an enormous amount of sym-
pathy for the record industry. Sales figures show that the companies
are not exactly in danger of going broke. 384 In addition, under section
203 of the Act, the record companies would be still able to exclusively
benefit from their artists' works, by the terms of the record contract,
for thirty-five years before the author can terminate. 385 If a record
company truly fears that one of its artists will terminate her contract,
the company can always negotiate with the artist in an attempt to dis-
suade her from leaving. If the companies agree to treat their artists
fairly from the beginning, then the artists will be less motivated to
terminate their agreements. In addition, simply because the authors
can terminate the license does not mean that they necessarily will. 386
There is no harm in allowing artists to reclaim their works, especially
if the record company is no longer promoting the album. The artist
should have the opportunity to find a new market for their product.
This solution would also promote predictability and stability within
the industry by preventing background musicians and others, who
have a licensed contribution on the recording, from terminating their
380. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
381. See supra note 239 and accompanying text.
382. See Norrell, supra note 165, at 456.
383. Id.
384. According to the RIAA, sales figures for sound recordings reached almost $15 billion in
1999. RIAA Market Reports on U.S. Recorded Music Shipments, at http://www.riaa.com/MD-
US.3.cfm (last visited Mar. 1, 2001). This total was almost a billion dollar increase over sales
from the previous year. 1999 Music Consumer Trends, at http://www.riaa.com/pdf/1999_Con-
sumerProfile.2.pdf (last visited Mar. 1, 2001).
385. 17 U.S.C. §203 (1994).
386. See supra note 99 (discussing the limited uses of section 304, the termination provision
for works created before 1978).
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agreements. One reason that artists, who are able to retain ownership
of their recordings, have registered their recordings with the Copy-
right Office as works made for hire is that they do not want the
backup musicians on the album to claim a right to the recording. 387
They fear that a random backup guitarist will arrive at the door of the
copyright owner thirty-five years after a recording is created and ter-
minate his licensed performance on the album. If this were to occur,
then the license grantee would no longer own the rights to that part of
the recording.388 Because it is difficult to eliminate the contribution of
one musician from a recording, the license holder would no longer be
able to market the recording. 389 By allowing sound recordings to par-
tially qualify for work-for-hire status, this problem can be avoided.
Even a new legislative solution may not solve the problem entirely
because the legislation would have no effect on recordings created be-
tween 1978 and the enactment of the legislation, unless it was applied
retroactively. There are a large number of commercially successful
recordings that were created in the past twenty-two years including:
"Come on Over" by Shania Twain; "Cracked Rear View" by Hootie
& The Blowfish; and "Jagged Little Pill." by Alanis Morrissette. 390
All of these recordings have the potential to retain some commercial
success for thirty-five years, and it would be only fair to allow the
artists who created these extremely successful recordings to reap the
benefits of their own success. By applying the statute retroactively,
any potential problems that could result from allowing the courts to
decide the matter would be eliminated, and the artists could control
the future of their creations.
VI. CONCLUSION
A recording artist must overcome incredible odds to become suc-
cessful in the industry. Many musicians work for years before ob-
taining a recording deal. Once they finally receive an offer from a
record company, the company is in complete control of the deal be-
cause it assumes all of the financial risk.39' The drafters of the Copy-
right Act were very aware of the reality that, in general, artists have
no bargaining power when they negotiate a deal before they realize
387. Hearings, supra note 91, at 93 (statement of Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights).
388. See Frisch, supra note 160, at 212.
389. Id.
390. SHANIA TWAIN, COME ON OVER (Polygram 1997); HoOTIE & THE BLOWFISH, CRACKED
REAR VIEW (Atlantic Records 1994); ALANIS MORRISSErI-E, JAGGED LI-rLE PILL (Maverick
Records 1995). Each of these recordings is in the top fifteen of the RIAA's all-time bestseller
list. All-Time Best Sellers, at http://www.riaa.com/Gold-Best-5.cfm (last visited Mar. 1, 2001).
391. See supra note 239 and accompanying text.
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the potential for their works. As a result, the termination rights provi-
sion was created to allow artists who were under-compensated
throughout their careers to have a second chance at the opportunity to
profit from their creations. 392
By passing the sound recording amendment in 1999, Congress
stripped recording artists of these very rights without allowing them to
express their views. Instead, the amendment was passed based on an
assumption that sound recordings were works-for-hire because the re-
cord companies labeled them as such.393 However, before the amend-
ment was passed, it was not a forgone conclusion that sound
recordings could be considered works made for hire. Artists are not
employees of the record companies and most sound recordings did
not fit within any of the previously enumerated categories of works
that qualified for work-for-hire status. 394 By passing the Works Made
for Hire and Copyright Corrections Act of 2000, Congress acknowl-
edged its mistake in concluding that sound recordings were works-for-
hire. The Copyright Act was designed to promote creativity and
works of authorship. 395 By returning recording artists' termination
rights, Congress reinstated the artists' incentives to create music. Now
recording artists can dedicate their lives to creating music with the
knowledge that they will have the opportunity to own their works at
some point in the future.
Kathryn Starshak
392. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
393. See supra notes 143-144 and accompanying text.
394. See supra notes 193-330 and accompanying text.
395. See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
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